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State Constitutional Design and Education
Reform: Process Specification in Louisiana
SCOTT R. BAURIES*
"Constitutions tempt those who are much too sure they are right."
-Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III'
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the fifty United States, Louisiana is unique in many ways. The
state maintains a hybrid civil-law system, closer in many ways to the
Continental European model than the traditional English-American
common-law model.2 The state is nominally subdivided into parishes,
rather than counties. The state statutes contain several references to the
French origins of the state and the continuing relevance of French and
its Cajun and Creole derivatives as spoken languages in the state.' The
food is just, well, better. The list goes on. These important differences
aside, Louisiana, like every other state in the Union, lives under a rati-
fied foundational document of primary law that the state terms its
Constitution. Depending on the source one consults, the current
*Assistant Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law. I give my heartfelt thanks to
the organizers of, and participants in, the AALS Education Law Section's panel on education in
New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina for bringing this important issue to light at the Annual
Meeting. I also thank the editorial staff of the Journal of Law and Education for their hard work,
helpful suggestions, and flexibility during the editing process. All errors, omissions, and opinions
are, of course, my own.
1. Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Gay Rights and American Constitutionalism: What's a
Constitution For?, 56 DuKE Li. 545, 581 (2006).
2. See, e.g., 15A AM. JUR. 2D COMMON LAw § 10 (2008) (citing Dieball v. Cont'l Cas. Co.,
176 So. 2d 774 (La. App. 1965), writ refused, 179 So. 2d 272 (1965), and Minor v. Young, 89 So.
757 (La. 1920) for the proposition that civil codal law is the foundational law of Louisiana, but
also citing State v. Kemp, 205 So. 2d 411 (La. 1967) for the proposition that the common law
provides the rule of decision where no statute or code exists).
3. Robin E. Schulberg, Katrina Juries, Fair Cross-Section Claims, and the Legacy of Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 53 Loy. L. REv. 1, 11 (2007).
4. For example, the statutes explicitly specify that French-language contracts are of the same
binding effect as English-language contracts. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1:51 (2003). The statutes also
require the teaching of French language and culture in all state public schools. LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 17:272 (2001).
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Louisiana Constitution is either its eleventh (the most of any state) or its
ninth (tied with Georgia for the most among the states).' It is also sec-
ond to Georgia's in recentness of ratification.' Regardless of its relative
youth or the numerosity of its antecedents, though, the current Louisiana
document substantially resembles the constitutions of many other states.
As to education, the Louisiana Constitution contains the familiar gen-
eral mandate for the establishment of a public school system, now ubiq-
uitous among state constitutions.' But unlike the founding documents of
any of the other states, Louisiana's constitution also provides for a very
specific process-based allocation of the responsibilities for determining
appropriations levels in education from year to year.'
5. See LEE HARGRAVE, THE LOUISIANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 1 (1991)
(stating that the current state constitution is the eleventh); Neal Devins, How State Courts Take
Consequences into Account: Toward a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism,
62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1640 (2010) (same); Lawrence M. Friedman, State Constitutions in
Historical Perspective, 496 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sa. 33, 35 (1988) (describing Georgia
as having had ten constitutions, and describing Louisiana as having taken "some sort of prize"
for having had eleven, as of 1985). See also Mark T. Carleton, Elitism Sustained: The Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, 54 TuL. L. REv. 560, 560 (1980) (stating that the current state constitution
is the eleventh). But see Richard E. Berg-Andersson, Louisiana in THE GREEN PAPERS: STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2010), http://www.thegreenpapers.com/sig/st.phtml?state=LA (describing
the state as having ratified nine constitutions); Richard E. Berg-Andersson, Georgia in THE
GREEN PAPERS: STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2010), http://www.thegreenpapers.com/
slg/GA.html (also describing Georgia as having ratified nine constitutions).
6. See Devins, supra note 5, at 164041 (naming Georgia's as the most recent). But see
Rhode Island General Assembly Website, Constitution of the State of Rhode Island and
Providence Plantations, http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/RiConstitution/constintro.html (last visited
July 23, 2010) (recounting the constitutional revisions that occurred in the state and stating that
it is the "1986 Rhode Island Constitution which appears on the General Assembly website"). If
this claim is true, then Rhode Island has the most recently enacted state constitution. However,
according to the site, the most recent "Constitutional Convention" held in the state "proposeld] a
number of amendments to be placed before the voters, but it also prepared an updated version of
the 1843 Constitution, which incorporated previous amendments and eliminated all language that
had been superseded." Id. If so, then this would most properly been seen as the comprehensive
amendment of the existing state constitution, rather than the adoption of a new state constitution.
See Richard E. Berg-Andersson, Rhode Island in THE GREEN PAPERS: STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT (2010), http:lwww.thegreenpapers.com/slg/st.phtml?state=R (describing the
1843 constitution as the state's current document).
7. See LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("The legislature shall provide for the education of the peo-
ple of the state and shall establish and maintain a public educational system."); see also id., pmbl.
("The goal of the public educational system is to provide learning environments and experiences,
at all stages of human development, that are humane,just, and designed to promote excellence in
order that every individual may be afforded an equal opportunity to develop to his full poten-
tial.").
8. See LA. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 13(B) (providing for a specific allocation of powers in devel-
oping an absolute funding amount each year and setting the previous year's funding amount as
the default in the case of impasse).
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It is well-known that state constitutions often treat numerous-some-
times trivial-subjects, or contain provisions that seem hyper-specific and
statutory, rather than foundational and constitutional, and state constitu-
tions have been roundly criticized (and sometimes defended) for these fea-
tures.9 In this Article, I argue that one form of specification-process-based
specification-found in many state constitutions, and in the Louisiana edu-
cation article itself, can be defended normatively as a way of establishing
effective checks and balances where socioeconomic policy development is
concerned. In particular, in cases of potential political crisis or exigency,
process-based specification (in contrast with no specification or substance-
based specification) enables the judiciary to be a legitimate check on the
legislature's policy choices without making the judiciary into the oft-
maligned "super-legislature" of judicial activism lore.o
In Part II, I examine the role of state constitutional design in shaping
the challenges of educational reform. I begin with a brief discussion of
state constitutional design in general, and I expand this discussion to
include the specific drafting approaches used in promulgating state con-
stitutional education duties. I continue from this point with a review of
how these provisions have been used in school finance litigation-the
principal vehicle for enforcing education rights in the states-and how
they have been modified in response to such litigation. From this review,
9. See, e.g., G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONsTrrLTHONs 2 (1998) (explaining that
inclusion of "prosaic" subjects in state constitutions causes scholars to neglect them); Wilkinson,
supra note 1, at 573. ("Constitutions should be articulations of fundamental law, not second lay-
ers of positive law."); Christopher W. Hammons, State Constitutional Reform: Is It Necessary?,
64 ALB. L. REv. 1327, 1327 (2001) (recounting these critiques as presented by the League of
Women Voters in a New York constitutional debate); Ann Lousin, Challenges Facing State
Constitutions in the Twenty-First Century, 62 LA. L. REV. 17, 26 (2001) (arguing that state con-
stitutions containing excessive detail will unduly constrain legislatures in the coming years);
Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. S0. REv. 355, 366
(1994) (concluding, based on empirical analyses, that "constitutional brevity and a moderately
difficult amendment process" would serve best to protect the rationally self-interested choices of
constitutional framers); See also Friedman, supra note 5, at 36 (describing the constitutions as
containing a "miscellaneous storehouse of provisions, which we might call super-legislation");
John Kincaid, State Constitutions in the Federal System, 496 ANN. AM. ACAD. PoL. SCI. 12, 18
(1988) ("A common criticism of state constitutions is that they are too long."); id. at 19 ("As
many critics have argued, state constitutions ordinarily contain 'a great deal of matter which is in
no distinctive sense constitutional law, but general law . . . fit to be dealt with in ordinary
statutes."') (quoting JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 443 (1907)) (omission in
Kincaid). But see Hammons, supra, at 1338-40 (defending prolixity in state constitutions based
on empirical evidence that prolixity is linked to longevity in the document's lifespan).
10. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence In Excess:
Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 587 (2009) (describing the
current U.S. Supreme Court as a "superlegislature," due to its manipulation of its own docket).
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I conclude that this litigation has caused at least some state reformers to
secure changes to the constitutional text, but that these reforms have
secured few of the results intended by reformers. In Part III, I outline the
education provisions in Louisiana's current state constitution. I review
both the drafting strategies used in the initial education article, and the
unsuccessful school finance litigation that gave rise to the most promi-
nent recent changes to the education article. I conclude from this Part
that Louisiana's reformers have chosen a decidedly unique, process-
oriented path in amending Louisiana's education article, as compared
with reformers in other states.
In Part IV, I present both general and situational arguments in support
of the specification of process-based limitations as a strategy appropri-
ate for drafting or amending state constitutional education articles. I base
the general argument on the unique features of state constitutions and
state governments, which leave courts well-positioned for review of leg-
islative processes. I base the situational argument on a case study of
Louisiana's constitution in light of the current funding realities in the
New Orleans school system. I argue that the specific, process-based lim-
itations in the Louisiana Constitution could prove very useful in the
coming years as federal relief funding largely disappears, and Louisiana
is left to fund the state's schools based mostly on state-derived revenues.
Based on these arguments, I conclude with the suggestion that those
drafting and amending state constitutions containing affirmative legisla-
tive duties should consider specific, process-based limitations as a use-
ful element of state constitutional design.
II. SCHOOL REFORM AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
In today's legal climate, school reform generally occurs through one
of three vehicles. The first is state legislation, which in recent years has
cemented the standards and accountability movement into education
policy;" has enabled the rise of charter schools, vouchers, homeschool-
ing, and other school choice mechanisms; and most recently, has begun
11. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-18-100 (2008) et seq. (providing for a fairly typical state-
level system of educational standards, testing, and accountability).
12. See, e.g., Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-3313.979 (West 2010) (providing for a
limited school voucher program). The Supreme Court held this statute did not violate the
Establishment Clause in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
[Vol. 40, No. 1
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to alter the tenure system and teacher retention." The second is federal
legislation, most prominently exemplified through the No Child Left
Behind Act, 4 the Elementary and Secondary Education Act" (of which
NCLB is a recent amendment), and the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act.'6 The third, and the most controversial, is the courts.
This latter vehicle for education reform, as I will explain below,
derives its power over educational policy from state constitutional pro-
visions imposing legislative duties to provide for education. Much
scholarship has examined the workings of this litigation, but little of it
has focused on questions of state constitutional design ex ante." Here, I
contend that focusing a bit more attention on state constitutional design,
and possibly becoming involved in the formal process of constitutional
change-whether through amendment or revision-might aid reformers
in accomplishing the systemic changes they desire in education. Below,
I consider the most salient unique features of state constitutional design
and how they have affected the state constitutional provisions most
important to education reform litigation-the education articles-with
an eye toward informing the efforts of education reformers and state
constitutional framers.
A. State Constitutional Design
State constitutions and state constitutionalism have become very
important in recent decades, spawning an entire school of studies falling
13. See, e.g., Colleen Slevin, Ritter Signs Teacher Tenure Legislation, CBS Colorado &
Denver News (May 20, 2010), available at http://cbs4denver.com/local/Colorado.
governor.bill.2.1706972.html (last visited July 22, 2010) (reporting the enactment of controver-
sial teacher evaluation and tenure legislation in Colorado).
14. Pub. L. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001) (now codified substantially at 20 U.S.C.A. §
6301 (West 2002) et seq.).
15. 20 U.S.C.A. § 6301 (West 2002) et seq.
16. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 (West 2005) et seq.
17. Most notably Professor Thro, but also many others, have examined state constitutional
provisions for textual differences and have posited that such differences ought to be salient in lit-
igation, focusing on the salience that courts should place on textual differences that exist within
substantive duty provisions. See, e.g., William E. Thro, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of
State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REv. 1639,
1661-70 (1989) (categorizing existing state constitutional provisions relating to education based
on the duties they impose, and opining as to their judicial enforceability). I would view these
studies as ex post analyses of constitutional effectiveness. Here, I attempt to identify some prin-
ciples of constitutional design that can be examined ex ante by policy makers in determining the
structure and content of a state constitution under construction with an eye toward limiting the
role of the courts prospectively.
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under the banner, the "New Judicial Federalism."" Of course, the recent
prominence of state constitutionalism has also caused it to draw signifi-
cant scholarly criticism." The most familiar critique of state constitu-
tions as foundational documents is that they are needlessly prolix in
scope, often covering fairly trivial matters best reserved for legislation
and administrative rulemaking.20 A subset of this critique holds that,
even as to the subjects that state constitutions cover, the documents are
overly detailed and statute-like, often detailing the most minute aspects
of particular policies, resulting in a reduction of legislative discretion in
adapting state policy to changing times.2 1
Clearly, some state constitutions, including the Louisiana
Constitution, attempt to cover subjects and policy areas best reserved for
a document other than the fundamental law of the state, and do so in
statute-like detail.22 For example, the Louisiana Constitution contains
detailed civil service rules for police officers, including rules for reduc-
tions in force based on classifications of employees, as well as a "penal-
18. See, e.g., ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTfrurIONs 113-34
(2009) (explaining the New Judicial Federalism).
19. The most impactful critique of state constitutionalism is that of Professor Gardner, who
views the enterprise largely as a "failed discourse." James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of
State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 761 (1992).
20. See, e.g., TARR, supra note 9, at 2 (explaining that inclusion of "prosaic" subjects in state
constitutions causes scholars to neglect them); Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 573. ("Constitutions
should be articulations of fundamental law, not second layers of positive law."); Hammons, supra
note 9, at 1327 (recounting these critiques as presented by the League of Women Voters in a New
York constitutional debate); Lutz, supra note 9, at 366 (concluding, based on empirical analyses,
that "constitutional brevity and a moderately difficult amendment process" would serve best to
protect the rationally self-interested choices of constitutional framers); Friedman, supra note 5,
at 36 (describing the constitutions as containing a "miscellaneous storehouse of provisions,
which we might call super-legislation"); Kincaid, supra note 9, at 18 ("A common criticism of
state constitutions is that they are too long."); id. at 19 ("As many critics have argued, state con-
stitutions ordinarily contain 'a great deal of matter which is in no distinctive sense constitution-
al law, but general law . . .fit to be dealt with in ordinary statutes."') (quoting BRYCE, supra note
9, at 443 (omission in Kincaid). See also Devins, supra note 5, at 1641 (pointing out that, due to
their inclusion of much greater detail over actions of legislatures, "state constitutions are, on
average, nearly four times longer than the Federal Constitution"). But see Hammons, supra note
9, at 1338-40 (defending prolixity in state constitutions based on empirical evidence that prolix-
ity is linked to longevity in the document's lifespan).
21. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 5, at 1640 (referring to such provisions as "super-legisla-
tion"); Lousin, supra note 9, at 26 ("Clearly, the state constitutions with the constraints of time-
bound 'legislative detail' will not succeed in meeting the flexibility needed to face the major chal-
lenges of the next century."); Carleton, supra note 5, at 576-77 (criticizing several provisions of
the Louisiana Constitution for their statutory character, brought about through the lobbying
efforts of special interest groups during the 1973 constitutional convention).
22. See generally Carleton, supra note 5.
[Vol. 40, No. 1
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ties" section and a section on appealing adverse employment decisions.'
The Florida Constitution, perhaps the most striking example of this pro-
lixity, even contains a provision banning the caging of pregnant sows
during gestation.24
Although these subjects are most likely better reserved to non-
constitutional state lawmaking, it is beyond cavil today that education is
not such a subject. As Chief Justice Warren famously wrote, "Today,
education is perhaps the most important function of state and local gov-
ernments."25 Every state constitution contains an education provision,2
and most of the national constitutions enacted or revised after World War
II do, as well." However, within their covered legislative subjects, state
constitutions also contain significant textual specification, both as to the
lawmaking function in general, and as to the accomplishment of enu-
merated policy ends.28 This sort of "statutory detail" has also subjected
state constitutions to criticism and commentary.29 I refer to this detail-
oriented strategy here as specification.
Outside of education provisions, specification as to the legislative
function in general tends to involve process-based limitations. Examples
of provisions aimed at placing specific limitations on the legislative
process include the bicameralism and presentment requirements familiar
to federal constitutional law."o But there are also numerous such limita-
23. See LA. CONST. Part IV.
24. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 21. Referring to a similar provision (this one protecting chick-
ens) inserted into the California Constitution by public referendum, the Honorable Ronald M.
George of the California Supreme Court quipped, "Chickens gained valuable rights in California
on the same day that gay men and lesbians lost them." Hon. Ronald M. George, Keynote Address:
Symposium on State Constitutions, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1515, 1517 (2010).
25. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
26. William E. Thro & R. Craig Wood, The Constitutional Text Matters: Reflections on
Recent School Finance Cases, 251 ED. L. REP. 510, 510 (2010).
27. See ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG, & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL
CONsTrTrnONs 28 (2009) (documenting the proliferation of social welfare provisions-including
education provisions-in national constitutions especially after World War II); Jeffrey Omar
Usman, Good Enough for Government Work: The Interpretation of Positive Constitutional Rights
in State Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REv. 1459, 1461 (2010) (comparing state constitutional social
welfare and education provisions to similar provisions found in many national constitutions,
"especially those adopted after 1945").
28. See WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 28 (introducing the idea of specificity in both procedure
and policy requirements).
29. See FRANK P. GRAD & ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TwENTY-
FIRST CENTURY VOL. 2: DRAFfING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, REVISIONS, AND AMENDMENTS 14-15
(2006) (reviewing the many critiques preferring "foundational" to "legislative" matter in state
constitutions).
30. Every state except Nebraska specifies that a bill must be approved by both legislative
houses and presented to the governor for signature in order to become a law. Michael E. Libonati,
January 2011]1
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tions that can only be found in state constitutions. Among these are bal-
anced budget requirements;" supermajority requirements, especially to
pass revenue-raising measures32 or measures imposing debt on the
state;" prohibitions against "local" or "special" legislation;" single-
subject rules for legislation;5 and rules against altering a bill's purposes
during the legislative process."3
Such provisions would seem to present no problems of judicial
enforcement-a judge can easily determine whether a piece of legislation
has a single subject or whether it was enacted by a supermajority. But
interestingly, states show different levels of willingness to enforce spe-
cific, process-based limitations." Often, these differences come down to
whether a particular state's courts follow the "enrolled bill rule," which
holds that the text of the enrolled bill, as passed and signed into law, is
the only evidence that a court will consider of the legislature's compli-
ance with procedural restrictions in the state constitution. It appears that
some state courts, by utilizing the enrolled bill rule, render some process-
oriented specifications in state constitutions effectively non-justiciable."
The Legislative Branch in STATE CONSTITITIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY VOL. III: THE
AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 52 (G. Alan Tar & Robert F. Williams, eds. 2006).
Nebraska has a unicameral legislature. Michael S. Dulaney, The Nebraska Legislature: A Brief
History in Nebraska School Finance, A Research Site Devoted to the Study of the Nebraska
School Finance System, available at http://schoolfinance.ncsa.org/unicameral/index.htm (last
visited July 22, 2010).
31. Typically, these take form as prohibitions against incurring debt. See Richard Briffault,
Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34
RUTGERs L.J. 907, 915-16 (2003) (describing debt-limitation provisions).
32. See WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 279 (discussing supermajority requirements in gener-
al); Briffault, supra note 31, at 931-32 (discussing supermajority requirements to pass certain
revenue measures).
33. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 916-17 (discussing supermajority requirements as a
means of limiting debt).
34. See WILLIAMs, supra note 18, at 277-79 (discussing provisions limiting local or special
legislation); Libonati, supra note 30, at 57-59 (same).
35. See WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 261-63 (discussing single-subject rules).
36. See id. at 263-67 (discussing alteration rules).
37. See WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 267-77 (discussing enforcement).
38. See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Lw Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 169
(1983) (reviewing the disparate approaches to the enrolled bill rule and its alternatives among the
states). I discuss one of these alternatives, the "journal entry rule," which limits judicial review to
the text of the bill itself and the entries in the legislative journal indicating that procedural restric-
tions have been followed, in the penultimate Part of this Article. See infra Part IV.B.2.
39. Id. at 204. As Professor Williams points out, restrictions on how many subjects a bill can
address, the inclusion of a title, and other restrictions apparent in the text of the bill may be enforced,
but restrictions on processes, such as prohibitions against changing the purpose of the bill during
the legislative process, are outside the reach of courts following the strict enrolled bill rule. Id.
[Vol. 40, No. 1
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Specification may also be more substance-based, requiring or forbid-
ding the pursuit or accomplishment of particular public policy goals.
Prominent examples of such substance-based specifications are the grow-
ing number of state constitutional provisions defining marriage as a union
of one man and one woman,*0 or the even more common provisions pro-
hibiting direct or indirect public subsidies to religious educational insti-
tutions.4 1 These provisions do not require anything of the legislature.
Rather, they preempt substantive legislation favoring homosexual rights
in the former case, and entangling religion with the state in the latter case,
by enshrining an otherwise permissible (but certainly not required) poli-
cy choice in the state's foundational law. State constitutions contain many
such provisions, some covering important and appropriate subjects such
as the extent to which state sovereign immunity is waived42 and others
covering the irretrievably prosaic, such as the kinds of nets that one may
use to catch fish in state waters.43
Another form of substance-based specification exists in state constitu-
tions, however, one which attempts to allow for legislative discretion in
determining the content of public policy, but which also attempts to
cabin that discretion through the imposition of qualitative standards.
Overwhelmingly, these substance-based specifications appear in the
affirmatively stated social welfare provisions found uniquely among
state constitutions, including state education articles."
B. State Education Provisions
The most common locus of substance-based specifications of qualita-
tive standards is a state constitution's education article. Each of the fifty
United States has a provision in its constitution mandating, encouraging,
40. E.g., OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 ("Only a union between one man and one woman may
be a marriage valid in or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions"). More than half
of state constitutions have such provisions, and each election cycle, more are added to the total.
See, e.g., Human Rights Campaign, "Statewide Marriage Prohibitions" http://www.hrc.org/
documents/marriage.prohibitions 2009.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
41. E.g., KY. CONST. § 189 ("No portion of any fund or tax now existing, or that may here-
after be raised or levied for educational purposes, shall be appropriated to, or used by, or in aid
of, any church, sectarian or denominational school."). More than three-fourths of state constitu-
tions have such provisions.
42. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2,5 9.
43. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 16.
44. For a thoughtful analysis of non-education-related welfare provisions, see Burt
Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERs Li. 881, 893-
95 (1989).
January 2011]1
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or at least authorizing, the establishment and funding of a system of pub-
lic schools.4 5 Some of these education provisions are directive and
vague." Others are hortatory and vague.' Still others are permissive and
vague.' A few, mostly in states that have experienced school finance lit-
igation, are both directive and highly specific.49 I briefly outline the pro-
visions in the sections that follow. 50
1. Directive Provisions
The overwhelming majority of state constitutions provide explicitly
for a legislative duty to establish and maintain an educational system.
For example, the Minnesota Constitution provides:
The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly
upon the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the legislature
to establish a general and uniform system of public schools. The
legislature shall make such provisions by taxation or otherwise as
will secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools
throughout the state.5'
45. See R. CRAIG WOOD, EDUCATIONAL FINANCE LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
STATE AID PLANS-AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES 103-08 (3d ed. 2007) (listing the fifty state pro-
visions). In this Article, I refer to each state's general mandate or grant of power to develop an
education system as its "education clause." Where I mean to refer to an article of the state con-
stitution that contains many clauses relating to education, I use the term, "education article." For
example, the Louisiana Constitution's education clause can be found in article VIII, section 1.
The Louisiana Constitution's education article is Article VIII.
46. See, e.g., TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("A general diffusion of knowledge being essential
to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature
of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an effi-
cient system of public free schools.").
47. See, e.g., VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68 ("Laws for the encouragement of virtue and prevention
of vice and immorality ought to be constantly kept in force, and duly executed; and a competent
number of schools ought to be maintained in each town unless the general assembly permits other
provisions for the convenient instruction of youth.").
48. See ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256 ("The legislature may by law provide for or authorize
the establishment and operation of schools by such persons, agencies or municipalities, at such
places, and upon such conditions as it may prescribe, and for the grant or loan of public funds
and the lease, sale or donation of real or personal property to or for the benefit of citizens of the
state for educational purposes under such circumstances and upon such conditions as it shall pre-
scribe.").
49. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a)(1)-(3), (b) (mandating detailed class size limitations
in each grade, as well as a detailed scheme of providing free preschool education to all children
in the state).
50. The material in this section is adapted from my prior work. See Scott R. Bauries, State
Constitutions and Individual Rights: Conceptual Convergence in School Finance Litigation, 18
GEo. MASON L. REV. - (forthcoming 2011).
51. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
[Vol. 40, No. I
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Most of the other state education provisions take similar forms, using
directive and mandatory terms such as "shall" or "duty" to impose obli-
gations and directing these terms toward the establishment and mainte-
nance of a system of schools."
In some states, in addition to placing an explicit duty on the state to
provide for education, the constitutions specify detailed requirements for
the substantive provision of specific educational services and programs.
Florida's provision-the most substantively detailed by far-provides
for minimum class sizes and universal free preschool." North Dakota's
directs the inclusion of specific curricular content.' Texas's provision
mandates sufficient money to ensure free text books for the school chil-
dren of the state,-" as does Louisiana's." Virginia's also provides for free
textbooks, but only for children who have no ability to pay for them.:
Oregon's requires that the legislature fund the education system suffi-
ciently to allow for the universal achievement of the content standards
adopted for each grade." California's sets a floor under which school
expenditures may not be allowed to fall,"5 as does Missouri's.m
Nevertheless, the vast majority of state constitutional education pro-
visions share the common qualities of vagueness and indeterminacy.
They use words such as "thorough," "adequate" and "suitable" to define
the duties imposed, and they contain no definitions of such indetermi-
52. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARtz. CONST. art. XI, § 6; ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CoLn.
CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, §
1(a); GA. CONST. art. VIll, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST.
art. X, § 1; IND. CONST. art. IX, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 183; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art.
VIll, Pt. 1st, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VII, § 1; MASS. CONST. ch. V, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, §§
1, 2; Miss. CONsT. art. VIII, § 201; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEB.
CONST. art. VII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2; NJ. CONsT. art. VIII, § 4(1); N.M. CONsT. art. XII,
§ 1; N.Y. CONsT. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONsT. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, 2, 4; OHIO
CONST. art. VI, § 2; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, 8(1); PA. CONST. art. 111, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. VII,
§ 1; S.D. CONST. art. VIll, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST.
art. X, § 1; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 2; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, §§
1, 12; Wis. CONsT. art. X, § 3. For the complete text of each state constitution's main education
clause, see WooD, supra note 45, at 103-08.
53. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § I(a)(1)-(3), (b).
54. N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 ("In all schools instruction shall be given as far as practicable
in those branches of knowledge that tend to impress upon the mind the vital importance of truth-
fulness, temperance, purity, public spirit, and respect for honest labor of every kind.").
55. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 3(b) (amended 1999).
56. LA. CONST. art. VIll, § 13(A).
57. VA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 3.
58. OR. CONST. art. Vill, § 8.
59. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 8.
60. Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 5.
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nate terms.6 1 As discussed below, this indeterminacy has proven very
important to school finance litigation.
2. Hortatory Provisions
Several state constitutions employ terms that appear directive on a
first reading, as they use terms such as "shall," but they direct the force
of such duties to hortatory purposes, such as to "encourage" education.
For example, the California Constitution provides, "A general diffusion
of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the
rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all
suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agri-
cultural improvement."62 A few other state constitutions use similar com-
binations of mandatory and hortatory terms. In Vermont, the commit-
ment to education is presented in purely hortatory terms.6
Each of these hortatory provisions, like the more directive provisions
outlined above, contains specifications of substantive standards to be
pursued in the policy realm of education, but each couches its standards
in the language of discretion. Interestingly, despite their textual defer-
ence to legislative prerogatives, these less directive provisions have been
the subject of similar rates of school finance litigation, as compared with
the more directive provisions discussed above."6
61. See infra notes 99-101, 186-188 and accompanying text.
62. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1. This is a quotation of California's main education provision.
However, that state's constitution also contains significant amounts of directive content, such as
a provision mandating the maintenance of a free school for at least six months of each year in
each school district in the state. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; see also infra Part II.D. (discussing sev-
eral more directive provisions of California's constitution adopted through the amendment
process).
63. IOWA CONST. art. IX, § 3; NEv. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (amended 1956); N.H. CONsT. art. 83
(amended 1903); N.C. CONsT. art. IX, § 1; WYo. CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 1988).
64. V.S.A. CONST. § 68 (2010) ("Laws for the encouragement of virtue and prevention of
vice and immorality ought to be constantly kept in force, and duly executed; and a competent
number of schools ought to be maintained in each town unless the general assembly permits other
provisions for the convenient instruction of youth.").
65. For example, of the five states listed in note 63, the highest courts in all but Nevada have
addressed and ruled on traditional school finance suits. Nat'l Access Network, State By State,
available at: http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/state by state.php3 (last visited Nov. 3,
2010). And Nevada's highest court has adjudicated a non-traditional case brought by the
Governor to challenge a legislative impasse that prevented school funding legislation from being
passed. See Guinn v. Legislature of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269, 1272 (Nev. 2003), overruled in part by
Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339 (Nev. 2006).
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C. School Finance Litigation
Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education" and its progenitors,6"
the courts have taken a role in ensuring that political processes do not
operate to deprive politically powerless groups of children of the educa-
tional services to which they are entitled under state constitutions and
state laws.' The early cases, of course, involved racial segregation and
discrimination, but litigation-based reformers eventually altered their
approaches by seeking to attack education policies providing unequal
services based on socioeconomic status."9 These latter claims fell short
in federal courts, and as a result, reformers looked to state constitutions
to ground their challenges.o
Initially, state constitutional challenges largely mirrored those in fed-
eral courts, as reformers challenged denials of "equal protection," based
on state constitutional equal protection clauses, or similarly worded and
intended "uniformity" clauses, often contained within state education
articles." These early challenges did little to illustrate the uniqueness of
state constitutional design, other than to illustrate that, though the claims
were similar to those in federal court, it was possible from time to time
to achieve different results under state constitutions. For example, a
school finance plaintiff might prevail in state court because a state might
recognize education as a fundamental constitutional right,72 where the
federal courts never have.'
66. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
67. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher
Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
68. For a complete overview of the types of challenges brought against state school funding
plans, see generally WOOD, supra note 45, at 53-87.
69. See San Antonio Indep. Sch Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
70. See, e.g., William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave: The Massachusetts
Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REv. 597, 601-03 (1994) (discussing the movement from feder-
al to state courts).
7 1. Id. at 602.
72. Bauries, supra note 50, manuscript available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1598523 (surveying the early cases and finding that, although the doc-
trinal approaches to the cases were generally similar to the federal "scrutiny" approach under the
Fourteenth Amendment, reformers were sometimes able to achieve better results in state courts).
73. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450,458 (1988) (declining to recognize a
"fundamental right" to education under the U.S. Constitution). This case had the effect of reaf-
firming Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), which had arguably been called into question by subsequent
Supreme Court case law relating to education. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,285-86 (1986)
(declining to decide whether education is a federal fundamental right); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
227-30 (1982) (applying a form of heightened scrutiny to invalidate a Texas law denying public
educational services to undocumented immigrant children). As other scholars have pointed out,
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Ultimately, though, the similarity in interpretation of equality provi-
sions between state and federal courts-what state constitutional law
scholars sometimes term "lockstepping"7- made these sorts of chal-
lenges less efficacious than reformers would have liked." Equality-based
challenges were also plagued by remedial concerns.7 6 As a result, the lit-
igation-based reform of education shifted to focus almost exclusively on
the substantive terms of state constitutional education provisions, which
are unique to state constitutions in our federal system." Reformers used
these provisions to seek "adequacy" of spending, rather than, or in addi-
tion to, equality." At this point, the divergences between state and feder-
al constitutional design should have begun to become apparent and influ-
ential, but litigation-based reformers generally focused only on the main
difference-that state constitutions have education articles, while the fed-
eral Constitution does not mention education."
under current jurisprudence, judicial recognition of a federal right to education is highly unlikely.
See R. Craig Wood & Bruce D. Baker, An Examination and Analysis of the Equity and Adequacy
Concepts of Constitutional Challenges to State Education Finance Distribution Formulas, 27 U.
ARK. LrTLE ROCK L. REv. 125, 136 (2004) (reviewing this line of cases, and concluding that "no
firm federal case yet exists").
74. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, A "Row of Shadows": Pennsylvania's Misguided Lockstep
Approach to Its State Constitutional Equality Doctrine, 3 WIDENER J. PuB. L. 343 (1993) (cri-
tiquing the lockstep adoption of federal equal protection doctrine in Pennsylvania).
75. See Bauries, supra note 50 (discussing numerous equality-based cases in which state
defendants achieved victories, despite the cases being brought under state constitutions specify-
ing the importance of education).
76. See, e.g., Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of
Educational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REv. 701
(2010) (summarizing the findings of previous scholars that equity-based remedies gave rise to
certain problems, among them backlashes against the overriding of local taxing judgments in
politically powerful, wealthier school districts, the perceived political infeasibility of recapture of
funds from wealthy districts to supplement funding in less wealthy districts, and a practical fail-
ure to achieve increased expenditures for higher-spending, but especially needy, urban districts).
77. Id. at 704.
78. Id. at 705. But see, e.g., William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional
Constraints: A Re-examination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform
Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1185, 1283-96 (2003) (explaining that no clear line divides
equality theories from adequacy theories, and that in fact, both theories are present in most edu-
cation finance cases).
79. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 950-51 (Cal 1976) (agreeing with the plaintiffs
that the state constitution's version of an equal protection provision is to be interpreted inde-
pendently of federal equal protection doctrine, and that California's provision, due to the explic-
it importance of education in the text of the state constitution, views education as a "fundamen-
tal interest" for the purposes of equal protection analysis). Serrano II, as this decision is com-
monly called, ushered in the "equality" wave of school finance litigation, which was based on the
same sorts of arguments presented in that case. See, e.g., Thro, supra note 70, at 601 (describing
the equality wave, which Thro terms the "second wave").
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As a result of this obvious difference, reformers have had some meas-
ure of success in state courts, while the federal courts have been closed
to claims not directly attempting to enforce the principles of Brown.'
However, neither the successes nor the failures of school finance litiga-
tion have escaped the attention of reformers. In some cases, these suc-
cesses and failures have even led directly to changes in state constitu-
tional text. I discuss these changes next.
D. Constitutional Change in Response to School Finance Litigation
State constitutions are far more easily, and thus far more frequently,
amended than the federal document."' As to education provisions, the
amendment process has rarely been used.82 When it has been used, it has
most often been used to alter bureaucratic arrangements, changes out-
side the scope of this Article.' However, some notable amendments to
the central legislative duty-based educational provisions in state consti-
tutions have also been adopted. Such amendments most often are
responses to school finance litigation and school finance decisions.
For example, responding to Brown v. Board of Education,. arguably
the most important of all school finance decisions, segregationists in
Mississippi accomplished an amendment to the state constitution alter-
ing the language of the state's education clause from mandatory to dis-
cretionary in character." The proponents of the amendment were obvi-
ously taking note of the language in Brown proclaiming that
"[Education], where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms."" Apparently, the
80. Bauries, supra note 76, at 705.
81. E.g., TARR, supra note 9, at 3; WILuAMS, supra note 18, at 28.
82. Where changes have been made to education provisions, they have mostly resulted from
constitutional revision, as opposed to constitutional amendment. See generally Richard E. Berg-
Andersson, THE GREEN PAPERS: STATE AND LOCAL GovERNMENT (2010),
http://www.thegreenpapers.com (last visited July 5, 2010) (outlining the many constitutional
revisions that have occurred among the American states, and linking to state constitutions).
83. E.g., La. Acts 2008, No. 935, § I (approved Nov. 4, 2008, effective Dec. 8, 2008)
(amending the requirements for membership on the Board of Supervisors for the University of
Louisiana System found in Article VIII, § 6 of the Louisiana Constitution).
84. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
85. See JoHN W. WINKLE III, THE MISSISSIPPI STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 112
(1993) (outlining the history of the education clause in Mississippi); Hon. Michael P. Mills &
William Quin II, The Right to a "Minimally Adequate Education" as Guaranteed by the
Mississippi Constitution, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1521, 1526 (1998) (same).
86. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
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proponents of the 1960 amendment concluded that the way to evade
Brown was to remove the requirement that the state "undertake[] to pro-
vide [education]."r However, years passed, and ultimately, this language
could not withstand the test of historical progress.
The Mississippi state constitution was amended to correct this histor-
ical embarrassment in 1987, restoring the original mandatory "shall,"
and arguably strengthening the original mandate from one requiring the
legislature to "encourage" education to one requiring the legislature to
"provide for" education.' The cycle of change in Mississippi, then, has
been decidedly substance-based, with the general intent of each cycle of
amendment in response to Brown being either to eliminate or to restore
the basic legislative duty to provide for education. Interestingly, despite
the clear and recently expressed intent of the Mississippi public to
impose a directive obligation on the state legislature, Mississippi is one
of only four states never to have experienced a school finance-based
state constitutional suit."
As with most other state constitutional topics, Florida and California-
which have the most easily amendable constitutions among the fifty
states-have experienced extensive amendment efforts directed at their
education articles. 0 In Florida, the amendment process has been used to
alter the substantive terms of the education article three times, the first of
which was in direct response to an unsuccessful school finance suit.9' In
Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding, Inc. v. Chiles,
the Florida Supreme Court held the meaning of the terms of the educa-
87. Id. Interestingly (and thankfully) the amended provision was ignored judicially by the
Mississippi Supreme Court in the one case in which it should have been implicated. See Mills &
Quin, supra note 85, at 1526-27 (reviewing the court's decision in Clinton Mun. Separate Sch.
Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237 (Miss. 1985)). In Byrd, the court read the statutes of Mississippi to
create a limited fundamental right to a "minimally adequate" education, ignoring the amended
constitutional text's discretionary legislative language. Id.
88. Compare Miss. CONST. art. VIII, § 201 (1890) with Miss. CONST. art. VIII, § 201 (1987);
see Mills & Quin, supra note 85, at 1527 (describing the 1987 amendment).
89. Bauries, supra note 50 at n.19. The others are Delaware, Hawaii, and Utah. Id.
90. See generally CAL. CONST. art. VIII (providing for several mechanisms of amendment
and revision, including the popularly proposed initiative petition); FLA. CONST. art. XI (same, but
also mandating periodic constitutional revision by a specially appointed Constitutional Revision
Commission).
91. See, e.g., Jon Mills & Timothy McClendon, Setting a New Standard for Public
Education: Revision 6 Increases the Duty of the State to Make "Adequate Provision" for Florida
Schools, 52 FLA. L. REv. 329 (2000) (describing the process of adoption of the first amendment,
and indicating that it was adopted in response to the Florida Supreme Court's decision in favor
of the state in Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d
400 (1996)).
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tion article to present a non-justiciable political question, as these terms
were devoid of judicially discoverable and manageable standards."
Following that decision, the Florida Constitutional Revision Commission
held its constitutionally mandated periodic convention, and one of the
proposals that it considered and adopted was titled "Revision 6."
Revision 6 altered the text of Article IX, Section 1 of the Florida
Constitution to read as follows:
The education of children is afundamental value of the people of the
State of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to
make adequate provision for the education of all children residing
within its borders. Adequate provision shall be made by law for a
uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free pub-
lic schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education
and for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions
of higher learning and other public education programs that the
needs of the people may require.94
This text was viewed by its framers as more demanding than the prior
text, which merely mandated, "Adequate provision shall be made by law
for a uniform system of free public schools and for the establishment,
maintenance and operation of institutions of higher learning and other
public education programs that the needs of the people may require.""
As Dean Jon Mills, a member of the Revision Commission, pointed out
after its passage, the amendment was intended both to increase the leg-
islative funding duty and to make that duty judicially enforceable.'
No challenge to the adequacy-based terms of the amended provision
has reached the Florida Supreme Court to date," but currently, such a
92. Chiles, 680 So.2d at 408. See also FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1968) ("Adequate provision
shall be made by law for a uniform system of free public schools and for the establishment, main-
tenance and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that
the needs of the people may require.").
93. Mills & McClendon, supra note 91, at 331. This procedure of periodic, scheduled con-
stitutional revision is, as far as I can tell, unique among state constitutions. See Robert F.
Williams, Foreword: Is Constitutional Revision Success Worth its Popular Sovereignty Price?,
52 FLA. L. REv. 249, 252 (2000) (describing this procedure as "unique").
94. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1998) (emphasized text was substantially added through the
1998 revision).
95. FLA. CONsT. art. IX, § 1 (1968).
96. Mills & McClendon, supra note 91, at 331.
97. The Florida Supreme Court, in its landmark school voucher decision Bush v. Holmes,
referred to the amendment and even discussed its importance, but the disposition of the case
depended only on terms that have been in the education clause since 1968. For a brief analysis of
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challenge is working its way through the Florida court system.'
However, as I have pointed out elsewhere, if the Florida Supreme Court
remains concerned about the nebulousness of the terms in the education
clause, and their indeterminacy or judicial unmanageability, then the
amended text does little to assuage these concerns." Comparing the orig-
inal 1968 text with the text as amended in 1998 reveals that the amend-
ment merely added several indeterminate terms to the ones already pres-
ent in the 1968 text. Now, instead of being required to make "adequate
provision" for a "uniform" system of "public" schools, the Legislature
has "a paramount duty" to "make adequate provision" for a "uniform,
efficient, safe, secure, and high quality" system of public schools.'" No
argument can be made that the new terms do not give the text more
rhetorical force, but if the court's main concern continues to be indeter-
minacy, then the 1998 amendment has not addressed this concern.'o
Two other amendments to the education article have been adopted in
Florida since the 1998 effort, and these amendments deserve attention
due to their uniqueness among state constitutional education provisions.
The first, adopted by the voters in 2002, resulted from a popular initiative
and referendum. The 2002 amendment was directed at imposing very
specific limitations on the number of students that could be assigned to
each classroom in the different levels of schooling used in Florida.02 The
the decision, see Scott R. Bauries, Florida 's Past and Future Roles in Education Finance Reform
Litigation, 32 1. EDUC. FIN. 89 (2006).
98. See Scott R. Bauries, New Adequacy Suit in Florida, EDJURIST (2009), available at
http://www.edjurist.com/blog/new-adequacy-suit-in-florida.htmi (last visited July 27, 2010)
(introducing the suit and linking to the court documents).
99. See Bauries, supra note 97 (making this argument).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. The 2002 amendment adds the following text to the previously amended text:
To assure that children attending public schools obtain a high quality education, the legisla-
ture shall make adequate provision to ensure that, by the beginning of the 2010 school year, there
are a sufficient number of classrooms so that:
(1) The maximum number of students who are assigned to each teacher who is teach-
ing in public school classrooms for prekindergarten through grade 3 does not exceed
18 students;
(2) The maximum number of students who are assigned to each teacher who is teach-
ing in public school classrooms for grades 4 through 8 does not exceed 22 students; and
(3) The maximum number of students who are assigned to each teacher who is teach-
ing in public school classrooms for grades 9 through 12 does not exceed 25 students.
The class size requirements of this subsection do not apply to extracurricular classes. Payment of
the costs associated with reducing class size to meet these requirements is the responsibility of
the state and not of local schools districts. Beginning with the 2003-2004 fiscal year, the legisla-
ture shall provide sufficient funds to reduce the average number of students in each classroom by
at least two students per year until the maximum number of students per classroom does not
exceed the requirements of this subsection. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (2002).
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amended text limits the enrollment in each classroom in the primary
grades to no more than eighteen students, in the intermediate grades to no
more than twenty-two students, and in the secondary grades to no more
than twenty-five students." This provision would seem to suffer from
none of the indeterminacy-based flaws of the original education clause,
and indeed education clauses nationwide. It is therefore puzzling that no
legal challenge has yet been successfully brought to enforce it.
The most plausible explanation for the lack of judicial activity is that,
as a clear, statute-like provision, the amended text is largely being com-
plied with. Based on recent media reports, this appears to be the case,
but in the midst of a recession, such compliance has placed an onerous
burden on school budgets." In fact, in the election cycle just completed,
a proposed Florida constitutional amendment directed at modifying
(some would say "undercutting") the class size requirements narrowly
fell short of passage.' Thus, while it was a promising attempt to intro-
duce determinacy into the legislative duty to fund and provide for edu-
cation in the state, the 2002 amendment might ultimately stand as a les-
son that statute-like substantive provisions are vulnerable to the winds of
political change.
One further amendment to the Florida Legislature's substantive duties
bears mention here. In 2002, alongside the class size amendment, the
voters of Florida adopted additional provisions intended to impose a leg-
islative duty to provide free preschool education to students in the
state.'06 Like the class size amendment, this amendment sought to pre-
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Megan Downs, Class-Size Rules Squeeze Schools, FLORIDA TODAY (Jul. 25,
2010), available at http://www.floridatoday.com/article/20100725/NEWSO1/7250351/
Class-size-rules-squeeze-schools (last visited July 27, 2010).
105. See Revision of the Class Size Requirements for Public Schools, Florida Dept. of State,
Division of Elections (2010 Initiative Page), available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initia-
tives/initdetail.asp?account= 10&seqnum=75 (last visited July 27, 2010) (presenting the text of an
amendment proposing to create certain exceptions to the requirement, and to modify it from
being a classroom-based limitation to being a school average-based limitation); Florida Election
Watch, Unofficial Election Results, Amend. No. 8 (Rejected by the voters Nov. 2, 2010), avail-
able at: http://enight.elections.myflorida.com/contestdetails.aspx?con=900800 (last visited Nov.
5, 2010). The vote was 54.49% for approval, and 49.51% for rejection, but the Florida
Constitution requires a 60% majority for approval of an amendment. FLA. CONsT. art. XI, § 5.
106. The second 2002 amendment added two new sections to Section 1, which provide as
follows:
(b) Every four-year old child in Florida shall be provided by the State a high quality
pre-kindergarten learning opportunity in the form of an early childhood development
and education program which shall be voluntary, high quality, free, and delivered
according to professionally accepted standards. An early childhood development and
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emptively enshrine in the constitutional text one of the commonly
sought, but infrequently awarded substantive remedial prescriptions for
educational quality in school finance litigation.o' In this case, the effort
appears to have worked. Evidenced by legislative enactments complying
with the new constitutional command, the legislature has put the pre-
school requirement into operation, and no attempts are currently afoot to
modify or repeal it.'o"
One reason for this apparent success could be the language of the
amendment, which explicitly establishes an individual right to preschool
education, and leaves the statutory material relating to establishing
preschools themselves mostly to the legislative process.'" In contrast,
the class size amendment, like the main education clause, omits any
mention of individual entitlements and limits itself to setting forth leg-
islative duties. Whatever the viability of political attacks against sub-
stantive provisions prescribing programmatic policies, it is very difficult
to make such an attack against a specific right presently possessed by an
individual.
However, both the class size provision and the preschool provision
could lead to unintended consequences. As others have pointed out, once
a substantive legislative policy choice is enshrined in the constitutional
text, it can have the effect of hamstringing legislative efforts to respond
to changing circumstances.' 0 Although it is difficult to imagine the elim-
education program means an organized program designed to address and enhance each
child's ability to make age appropriate progress in an appropriate range of settings in
the development of language and cognitive capabilities and emotional, social, regula-
tory and moral capacities through education in basic skills and such other skills as the
Legislature may determine to be appropriate.
(c) The early childhood education and development programs provided by reason of
subparagraph (b) shall be implemented no later than the beginning of the 2005 school
year through funds generated in addition to those used for existing education, health,
and development programs. Existing education, health, and development programs are
those funded by the State as of January 1, 2002 that provided for child or adult educa-
tion, health care, or development.
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (2002).
107. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Preschool?, 94 CAL. L. REv.49, 52
(2006) (reviewing school finance decisions in which preschool remedies were considered by the
courts).
108. See Legislation for VPK and Related Programs, Fla. Dept. of Educ., Early Learning
and Kindergarten Page, available at http://www.fldoe.org/earlyleaming/legislative.asp (last vis-
ited July 27, 2010) (providing summaries of, and links to, all compliant legislation).
109. 1 have pointed out elsewhere that state supreme courts are loathe to discover and actu-
ally enforce individual rights to educational resources under state constitutions, but such rights
are not often so specifically set forth as they are in the Florida 2002 preschool amendment. See
Bauries, supra note 50.
110. E.g., Lousin, supra note 9, at 26.
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ination of preschool, for example, as an appropriate response to changed
circumstances, perhaps it would be advisable, given a serious situation,
to scale the program down. For instance, the state may want to means
test it, at least temporarily. Under the constitutional text as it currently
reads, however, this action would be unconstitutional. Thus, though it
would seem to make sense on its face, a substantive amendment such as
the Florida preschool amendment could create fiscal problems given
serious and unforeseen circumstances. The class size provision is subject
to the same critique. Simply put, such provisions are ill-suited to politi-
cal crises.
California offers a similar tale of constitutional change in response to
school finance litigation, but one which has proceeded along different
lines. The California Constitution's basic education provision, adopted
in 1879, simply provides:
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to
the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the
Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement."'
Along with this general duty provision, the 1879 Constitution initially
contained two more specific duty provisions. The first (which remains in
its initial form) provides:
The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by
which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each district
at least six months in every year, after the first year in which a
school has been established." 2
The second (which has since been altered substantially) originally pro-
vided:
The public school system shall include primary and grammar
schools, and such high schools, evening schools, normal schools,
and technical schools as may be established by the Legislature, or
by municipal or district authority; but the entire revenue derived
from the State School Fund, and the State school tax, shall be
111. CA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1879). The text of this provision remains current.
112. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (1879). The text of this provision remains current, despite an
unsuccessful attempt to repeal it entirely in 1968.
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applied exclusively to the support of primary and grammar
schools."'
Each of these provisions has become relevant to school finance reform
through both political action and litigation.
At various times, California has been the epicenter of school finance
reform. During the nascent period of state school finance litigation, the
California Supreme Court issued what was then a landmark decision,
Serrano v. Priest, holding that plaintiffs challenging the equality of the
distribution of educational resources based on wealth disparities stated a
valid claim for relief under the California Constitution."' In deciding
Serrano I, the court first had to determine whether school finance
inequality could be the basis of a state constitutional challenge at all. The
court rejected the plaintiffs' proposed reading of Section 5 of the
California education article as mandating strict equality in using the
word "common" to describe the state's schools."'
However, the court moved on to point out that the then-existing final
paragraph of Section 6 (which had by then grown through serial amend-
ments to six very statute-like paragraphs) clearly imposed on the legis-
lature the duty to set local property tax limitations. The provision in
question provided:
The Legislature shall provide for the levying annually by the gov-
erning body of each county, and city and county, of such school dis-
trict taxes, at rates not in excess of the maximum rates of school dis-
trict tax fixed or authorized by the Legislature, as will produce in
each fiscal year such revenue for each school district as the govern-
ing board thereof shall determine is required in such fiscal year for
the support of all schools and functions of said district authorized or
required by law.'16
113. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 6 (1879). This provision has been amended seven times since its
adoption, most recently in 1974, which removed some language in response to the landmark
Serrano v. Priest decision. See infra notes 115-154 and accompanying text (discussing Serrano I
and the constitutional response).
114. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) ("Serrano i').
115. Id. at 1249.
116. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 6 (1952). Actually, Section 6 at one time was as long as seven
paragraphs, but a 1962 amendment repealed then-Paragraph 7, reducing it to six at the time
Serrano I was decided.
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The court held that this provision "specifically authorizes the very ele-
ment of the fiscal system of which plaintiffs complain," namely the leg-
islature's enabling of wide disparities in local funding levels through
wide disparities in local revenue-raising."' The court continued to ana-
lyze the plaintiffs' equal protection claims with the state property taxa-
tion function outlined above in mind,"' ultimately holding (1) that the
state system discriminated based on district wealth;"' and (2) that edu-
cation was a "fundamental interest"'20 in California, thus requiring the
application of strict judicial scrutiny to this discrimination. 2 ' Based on
these decisions, the court remanded the case to the trial court.'22
Very shortly after Serrano I was decided, the California Constitution
was subjected to the first of several amendments made arguably in
response to school finance litigation. In 1974, the voters adopted an
amendment to the final paragraph of Section 6-the very paragraph that
the Serrano I court had recently used as its hook to evaluate the legisla-
ture's actions in financing the state system largely through property tax-
ation.'" But this paragraph was not eliminated from the state constitu-
tion. Rather, the amendment bifurcated the paragraph, changed the
wording slightly, and renumbered it as Sections 20 and 21 of Article
XIII, the taxation article.124 In doing so, the amendment removed from
the state constitution the legislature's explicit duty to set statewide limi-
tations on local property tax rates relating to schools, but preserved sub-
stantial legislative control over the local property taxation process.2
Now, the power to limit local school taxation became the power to limit
all local property taxation, but any school taxes mandated by the legis-
lature would have to be subject to such limits.'26 Soon thereafter, the
court was faced with the Serrano case again. 27
117. Serrano 1, 487 P.2d at 1249.
118. Id. at 1249 n.12 (relying on Section 6 to construe local funding as part of the total state
educational funding package).
119. Id. at 1252.
120. The court used this term congruently with the use of the term "fundamental right" in
federal court jurisprudence, though it more expansively interpreted the categories that properly
fit the description of "fundamental interest" than the federal courts would have. Id. at 1258.
121. Id. at 1249-50.
122. Id. at 1266.
123. Compare CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 6 (1962) with CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 6 (1974).
124. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 20, 21.
125. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 20 ("The Legislature may provide maximum property tax
rates and bonding limits for local governments.").
126. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 21.
127. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) ("Serrano Il").
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In Serrano II, the amended taxation duties now reflected in Section 21
of Article XIII became important. The court was forced to determine
whether the school finance system preserving the disparities then exist-
ing among property-rich and property-poor districts was actually man-
dated by the text of Section 21,'2 which now provides:
Within such limits as may be provided under Section 20 of this
Article, the Legislature shall provide for an annual levy by county
governing bodies of school district taxes sufficient to produce annu-
al revenues for each district that the district's board determines are
required for its schools and district functions.129
The state contended in Serrano II that this section required the legisla-
ture to preserve local differences in property tax revenues due to prop-
erty wealth. Rejecting this contention, the court explained that the only
mandate of Section 21 was that of legislative provision for an annual
levy, and that this mandate could not be read to extend to-or even to
authorize-the drawing of district lines so as to preserve wealth dispar-
ities.'o The court relied on another provision in the education article,
Section 14, to show that the legislature bore the sole responsibility for
drawing district lines, and that it was the drawing of these lines by
statute that either created or preserved wealth disparities, not the more
general mandates of Article XIII, Sections 20 and 21 to establish annu-
al property tax levies and millage limits."'
After applying its own state equal protection jurisprudence-and the
prior holdings of Serrano I-to this system, the court held the current
system unconstitutional. 32 As a mandate, the court stated that the legis-
lature would be responsible for reconstructing the system in accordance
with the principles stated both in the court's opinions in Serrano I and II
and with the trial court's order. 3 However, the court did not order any
specific legislative action."
128. Id. at 955.
129. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 21.
130. Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 955.
131. Id. at 955-56.
132. Id. at 957-58.
133. Id. at 957, n.54.
134. This passive way of remedying constitutional violations is quite common in school
finance litigation. Elsewhere, I have referred to the practice as "remedial abstention" because the
court essentially steps away from the case at the remedial stage, just as a court fully abstaining
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Following the court's decision in 1976, the legislature went to work
on its remedial legislation. The result was Appropriations Bill 65, a
school finance statute that, while not perfect in eliminating all inequali-
ties in the system, took a very large step in the direction of equality of
educational resources.'1 Had it become law, the bill would have estab-
lished upper limits on property taxation, required local districts to tax
themselves to a certain minimum millage rate, and "recaptured" some
quantum of funds from wealthier districts to redistribute to less wealthy
districts.136 The problem was that it never became the actual law of
California. A.B. 65 was preemptively eviscerated by way of a popular
initiative to amend the California Constitution, entitled "Proposition
13. "
Proposition 13 was placed on the ballot in late 1977 and passed by
overwhelming majority vote in June of 1978.'" Proposition 13 amended
the state constitution, limiting property taxation for all purposes to no
more than one percent of a property's fair market value.'" The measure
also rolled back assessed valuations to 1975-76 levels" and placed a cap
on future assessed valuation increases of two percent per year.'"' Finally,
Proposition 13 mandated that any state legislation enacted to raise rev-
enue by altering existing taxation would have to pass by a two-thirds
majority.'4 2 The result was immediate. The measure had the effect of cut-
ting existing property tax revenues statewide by 57% immediately.43
Because A.B. 65 relied on increased property tax revenues to succeed, it
would step away at the pre-merits phase. See Bauries, supra note 76, at 702. However, the
California court's action does not precisely fit the remedial abstention model because the court
actually maintained remedial jurisdiction over the case in Serrano II, while remedial abstention
courts, as I have defined them, generally do not maintain jurisdiction. See Serrano II, 557 P.2d at
957-58.
135. See Joseph T. Henke, Financing Public Schools in California: The Aftermath of
Serrano v. Priest and Proposition 13, 21 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 22, 22 n.87 (1986) (reviewing the leg-
islative response to Serrano II, specifically A.B. 65 (1977), the bill designed to implement the
courts' orders).
136. William A. Fischel, Serrano and Proposition 13: The Importance of Asking the Right
Questions, 25 ST. TAX NoTEs 535 (2008).
137. See Henke, supra note 135, at 22-23 (tracing the post-Serrano II chronology); see also
Fischel, supra note 136, at 535 (tracing the same chronology, but in tabular form).
138. Fischel, supra note 136, at 535; see also Christopher R. Lockard, Note, In the Wake of
Williams v. State: The Past, Present, and Future of Education Finance Litigation in California,
57 HASTINGs Li. 385, 389-90 (2005) (recounting the history of California school finance).
139. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1.
140. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(a).
141. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA § 2(b).
142. CAL. CONST. art. XIllA, § 3.
143. Fischel, supra note 136.
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essentially became a dead letter.'" Thus, from the date of its adoption,
Proposition 13 impacted the legislative response to the Serrano opin-
ions.' It also affected education policy from that date forward.
The practical effect of Proposition 13's substantive limits on local tax-
ation has been to establish a uniform, statewide property tax rate of one
percent of fair market value per year, initially keyed to 1975 values, and
limited to growth of two percent per year. " The measure also greatly
reduced local revenues for other purposes, resulting in greater central-
ization of spending on many formerly local responsibilities through
state-to-local assistance. 1As costs rose over the years, the state was cer-
tainly also greatly hampered in raising revenue to provide for equality in
school resources due to Proposition 13's two-thirds majority require-
ment for passing revenue-raising measures.'" One case study that sug-
gests the truth of this conclusion finds that California's education system
has slipped from being one of the best in the nation in the early 1970s-
both as to funding and as to outcomes-to being one of the worst in the
nation today.14 9
As education cuts became more common in response to Proposition
13's restrictions during the 1980s, voters responded with a protective
constitutional amendment in 1988, this one entitled Proposition 98.11o
144. Id., at 537.
145. There has been an ongoing debate between academic economists over whether Serrano
and its remedial legislation actually "caused" Proposition 13 to pass, especially considering that
similar proposed amendments had failed to pass by popular vote several times in the recent past.
See Fischel, supra note 136. Regardless of who is ultimately correct about the causal question, it
is certain that one of the purposes of Proposition 13 was to limit legislative discretion over taxa-
tion, discretion that it would need in order to comply with Serrano's general mandate. It is also
inarguable that Proposition 13 severely limited the legislature's ability to implement Serrano.
146. Henke, supra note 135, at 23.
147. Id.
148. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 927-39 (reviewing state taxation and expenditure limi-
tations and concluding that they drive much of revenue raising toward fees, which inherently can-
not be redistributive). In fact, the fees-as-replacement-for-taxes idea briefly found its way into
California's schools in the form of fees for participation in extracurricular activities, but the
California Supreme Court held that this practice was a violation of Article VIII, Section 5's
requirement for "free" schools. See Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35 (Cal. 1984).
149. See, e.g., Jennifer Sloan McCombs & Stephen J. Carroll, Ultimate Test: Who Is
Accountable for Education If Everybody Fails?, RAND REv. (Spring 2005), available at
http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/spring2005/ulttest.html (last visited July 28,
2010) ("Measured in year 2000 dollars, spending per pupil in California went from more than
$600 above the national average in 1978 to more than $600 below the national average in 2000
... The INAEP] data, shown as units of standard deviation from the national average, place the
test scores for California below those for every state except Louisiana and Mississippi.").
150. Lockard, supra note 138, at 391.
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This measure placed a "hard floor"' on educational expenditures, but
under the provision as approved, this floor is indexed to a complicated
set of demographic factors that make it very difficult to comprehend.152
A second amendment effort in 1990 added additional complexity.'5 3
These spending floors must have seemed welcome when they were first
enacted in the face of ever-declining school budgets, but the cuts have
continued, and based on the allegations in the current adequacy litigation
making its way through the California courts, it seems that as a result,
the spending "floor" has functionally become a "ceiling."" Further evi-
dence of the relative ineffectiveness of the Proposition 98 spending
floors has been the filing of three adequacy-based lawsuits since its pas-
sage, two of which resulted in some relief to the plaintiffs.
The first of these, Butt v. California, was brought by a group of par-
ents challenging their children's school district's announced intentions
to close school six weeks early that year due to lack of funds.' The
plaintiffs ultimately prevailed due to the "unprecedented disparity" that
six fewer weeks of school would create between the plaintiffs' district
and other districts in the state.'56 The second was Williams v. California,
which challenged the entire state system of schools, as had been done in
the Serrano cases.'" However, Williams based this challenge not only on
the equality-based grounds present in Serrano, but also on the alleged
inadequacy of spending and state management of local schools.' Also,
151. By "hard floor" I mean a level under which education spending is not permitted to sink.
In truth, the Proposition 98 "floor" (as later amended by passage of Proposition 111) is "hard,"
but it is also a "shifting floor." There is always a level under which state spending may not be
allowed to sink, but this level may change from year to year due to economic factors. See CAL.
CONST. art. XVI, § 8(b)-(h).
152. See CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 8(b)-(c) (providing three separate, exclusive triggers for
determining the lower limit of education spending in a particular year, one of which has four sub-
sections limiting its application).
153. See CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 8 (d)-(h) (added by Prop. Ill, approved June 5, 1990)
(modifying the Proposition 98 triggers and adding additional requirements and limitations to
them).
154. Robles-Wong v. State of Cal., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (filed
May 20, 2010, Calif. Super. Ct.), 101 ("With very few exceptions, the Proposition 98 'mini-
mum' has become a maximum funding calculation.").
155. 842 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1992).
156. Id. at 1252.
157. Lockard, supra note 138, at 403-04.
158. See id. (recounting the development, litigation, and settling of the Williams case). This
well-documented student note presents a worthy resource for those who wish to learn about the
Williams case and other school finance-related developments in California. I draw from it here
substantially in presenting Williams, which never resulted in a comprehensive published judicial
opinion on the merits.
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in contrast with Butt, Williams involved parties from across the state,
seeking to proceed as a class defined as students "who attend or will
attend elementary, middle, or secondary schools in California and are
deprived of one or more basic educational necessities."'5 9
Interestingly, the adequacy-based claims in Williams were ultimately
dismissed by the trial court. Examining Sections 1 and 5 of the
California education article (the only two sections discussed here that
remain in their original 1879 form), the court held that these provisions
stated mere "principles," and that no judicial order could be constructed
to enforce them.'" The equity-based claims remained, and the parties
ultimately reached a settlement four years into the litigation."' Under the
terms of the settlement, more than one billion dollars in new funding
was directed to under-resourced schools, and a complaint procedure
geared toward school facilities was initiated.' However, the general
condition of the California school system remains weak, so it is under-
standable that the state now faces a new school finance lawsuit-this
one premised predominantly on adequacy.
The plaintiffs in Robles-Wong v. California6" claim that the state is in
violation of its duties (1) to "first set apart" funding for education when
determining the state budget;'" (2) to provide for equal access and edu-
cational opportunity;' and (3) to adequately fund a system of common
schools for the purpose of a "general diffusion of knowledge."'" It is
interesting to note that, in California, in contrast to Florida, the provi-
sions added to the state constitution in response to (or at least in the con-
text of) school finance litigation-whether added by proponents of
greater or lesser expenditures-are not the provisions relied on for relief.
In fact, the substantive amendments accomplished by Proposition 98
and 111 are in fact treated by the plaintiffs as a contributing cause of
California's continuing educational funding deficiencies.'6" Of course,
this could not possibly have been the intent of the proponents of either
159. Id. at 403.
160. Id. at 410.
161. Id. at 411.
162. Id. at 411-12.
163. See supra note 154.
164. See CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 8(a) ("From all state revenues there shall first be set apart
the moneys to be applied by the state for support of the public school system and public institu-
tions of higher education.").
165. See CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 7; art. IV, § 16. Together these provisions are treated as
California's version of an equal protection clause. See Serrano II.
166. See CAL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 5, 6.
167. See supra note 154, at I 101.
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Proposition 98 or 111. Thus, the allegations of the Robles-Wong case
present a cautionary tale for those who would seek to establish a non-
negotiable spending floor as a way of preemptively securing the benefits
that successful lobbying or school finance litigation would otherwise
provide. It is possible that such a floor can also become a ceiling, effec-
tively freezing spending based on the needs of the system at one discrete
point in history and preventing legislative actors from responding to
changed circumstances.
Disappointing and unintended consequences are not necessarily limit-
ed to substance-based amendments sought by education activists. The
earlier substantive amendments accomplished in California by anti-tax
activists through Proposition 13 following Serrano II have also not fully
secured the stability their proponents sought. To begin with, the
Proposition 13 amendments were probably not directed at centralizing
education spending, but they have had that effect.'" Mandating such a
low property tax limit and such a small annual inflation rate has greatly
reduced the ability of localities to influence their own schools' funding.
These changes also have driven some courts to greatly broaden their
interpretations of what constitutes a permissible "fee," or a "special tax,"
to allow the exceptions to Proposition 13 to operate more freely-cer-
tainly not the intentions of the proponents of the measure. 69
As to the supermajority requirement for tax increases-the procedur-
al portion of the Proposition 13 amendment-it has certainly made tax
increases harder to enact. However, it has also made balancing the state
budget and responding to unforeseen crises nearly impossible, as we are
seeing now in the ongoing fiscal paralysis that grips California in 2010
and 2011.11o Of course, this commentary leaves aside the fact that the
Proposition 13 changes have also starved schools of funds, a regrettable
result, but one which may have been intended by its proponents. In the
final analysis, then, it seems that Proposition 13's lessons are that nar-
row substantive victories can be won through substance-based amend-
168. Henke, supra note 135, at 23.
169. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 937. These definitional expansions gave rise to a fol-
low-on amendment, entitled Proposition 218 in 1996 that swept these alternative revenue-raising
devices within the limitations and supermajority requirements of Proposition 13. Id. Still, courts
have found ways to define certain local fees as not qualifying for these limitations. Id.
170. See, e.g., Stuart Kasdin, California's Once and Future Budget Crisis: No Country for
Old Men ... Or Young Mothers, Sick Children, or Even Otters, 2 CAL. J. POL. & POL'Y (Issue 2,
Art. 7) 1, 3 (2010), available at: http://www.bepress.com/cjpp/vol2/iss2/7 (last visited July 31,
2010) (outlining the influence of Proposition 13's 2/3 majority requirement on California's cur-
rent budget woes).
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ments, but these victories may be short-lived, considering the role of the
courts in constitutional interpretation. As to process-based amendments,
it seems that the lesson of Proposition 13 is that such amendments
should be reasonable, above all, and that they should include safety
valves to account for unforeseen crises.
Another more recent litigation-related amendment focused directly on
the duty imposed on the state legislature occurred recently in Oregon,
and this amendment provides lessons about both substance-based and
process-based constitutional design. Prior to 2000, the education article
of the Oregon Constitution contained one of the more basic statements
of legislative duties relating to education found among the states.
Section 3 of Article VIII simply stated, "The Legislative Assembly shall
provide by law for the establishment of a uniform, and general system
of Common schools.""' The Oregon Supreme Court decided two equi-
ty-based cases under this provision, both in favor of the state.172 During
the 1990s, in response to the combination of (1) a much greater share of
education expenses being borne at the state level, due to a constitution-
al amendment limiting property taxation, similar to California's
Proposition 13;'" and (2) the development in the early 1990s of very
demanding educational content standards in Oregon,"' reformers
brought two additional successive school finance suits, neither of which
reached the Oregon Supreme Court."'
In the first suit, the plaintiffs contended that the state system of edu-
cation violated the plaintiffs' rights to equal protection under both the
Oregon and United States Constitutions, as well as the Oregon education
clause, due to inequalities in resources-specifically course offerings-
available across districts."' The Oregon Court of Appeals ruled in favor
of the state, as the Oregon Supreme Court had ruled in both prior equi-
ty-based cases to come before it."' The second suit was based on a chal-
171. OR. CONsT. art. VIII, § 3.
172. Coalition for Equitable Sch. Fund. v. State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991); Olsen v. State, 554
P.2d 139 (Or. 1976).
173. See OR. CONST. art. XI, § 11(b) (Created through initiative petition filed May 8, 1990,
and adopted by the people Nov. 6, 1990).
174. See Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century, OR. REv. STAT. § 326.705 et seq.
(1991) (now codified at OR. REv. STAT. §§ 329.005 et seq. (2009)).
175. Withers v. State of Oregon, 987 P.2d 1247 (Or. App. 1999), rev. denied (Or. 1999)
("Withers If"); Withers v. State, 891 P2d 675 (Or.App. 1995), rev. denied (Or. 1995) ("Withers l").
176. Withers 1, 891 P.2d at 677-78.
177. Id. at 679 (holding that, because Withers I presented "precisely the same arguments that
the court rejected in Olsen," the state was entitled to judgment).
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lenge to the legislature's progress in achieving equality of spending
throughout the state, a goal that had predisposed the court to rule in
favor of the state in the first suit."' Like the first suit, though, the second
resulted in a decision in favor of the state, with the court applying the
very deferential "rational basis" test as it had in all prior cases."' Thus,
as of the late 1990s, it was clear that equity-based school finance cases
would not be likely to succeed in the courts of Oregon.
However, at that time, the adequacy movement was burgeoning, with
recent rulings in New York,'8 Massachusetts,'"' and other states illustrat-
ing that the courts might be willing to look carefully at whether funding
in a particular state was sufficient to allow for students to achieve state-
determined goals.'8 2 Against this backdrop, reformers pursued through
Oregon's petition-based initiative process" an amendment to the educa-
tion article of the Oregon Constitution."
The amendment-the first of its kind among the states-sought to
explicitly tie the legislative duty to fund education directly to the
demanding content standards that had been developed in the state over
the last decade of the Twentieth Century. Specifically, the amendment
created Section 8(1) of the education article, which now provides:
The Legislative Assembly shall appropriate in each biennium a sum
of money sufficient to ensure that the state's system of public edu-
cation meets quality goals established by law, and publish a report
that either demonstrates the appropriation is sufficient, or identifies
the reasons for the insufficiency, its extent, and its impact on the
ability of the state's system of public education to meet those
goals 185
178. See Withers II, 987 P.2d at 1248-50 (recounting the reasoning of the Withers I court).
179. Id. at 1253.
180. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995).
181. McDuffy v. Sec. of the Exec. Off. of Educ., 615 NE 2d 516 (Mass 1993).
182. Professor Ryan has convincingly called into question whether any state's highest court
has made its decision based on the state content standards. James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing,
and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEx. L. REv. 1223 (2008). However, Professor Ryan also con-
cedes that the received wisdom at the time he wrote his article was that state content standards
matter to courts in school finance suits. Id. at 1224. Undoubtedly, this received wisdom provid-
ed a backdrop to the Oregon amendment.
183. OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
184. OR. CONsT. art. VIII, § 8(1) (Ballot Measure 1, Approved Nov. 7, 2000, Effective Jan.
1,2001).
185. OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 8(1).
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The amendment textually accomplished two objectives. First, it estab-
lished that the legislature's funding duty is in fact a duty to fund the sys-
tem such that the legislatively established content standards can be
achieved. Second, it called for legislative accountability to the public for
fulfilling this duty, requiring either that the legislature (1) document
publicly how the standards can be achieved under the current level of
funding; or (2) explain why sufficient funding cannot be appropriated.
Undoubtedly one impetus for making this sort of change was the ten-
dency of some state supreme courts, when faced with school finance
adequacy challenges, to hold such claims to be non-justiciable.' 6 The
most common reason for such non-justiciability determinations is the
perceived lack of "judicially manageable standards" in state education
articles." State education clauses have been described as "inherently
nebulous," due to their reliance on subjective adjectives, such as "thor-
ough," "efficient," "general," and "uniform."' One way of addressing
the indeterminate nature of education article language is to add more
determinative language to the constitutional text, and this appears to
have been the intent of the Oregon amendment.
186. See, e.g., Coalition of Adequacy and Fairness, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996)
(declining to construe the then-current text of the Florida Constitution's education clause, which
at that time called for "a uniform system of free public schools," and holding that these terms do
not establish "judicially manageable standards"); see also FIA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1968). Non-
justiciability describes a situation in which the reviewing court has jurisdiction over the claims and
the parties, but due to prudential considerations relating to the role of thejudiciary among the three
branches, the court declines to reach the merits of the case. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186,
217 (1962) (describing the main tenets of the political question doctrine, the main doctrine of pru-
dential justiciability: "Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multi-
farious pronouncements by various departments on one question.") (emphasis added).
187. See Bauries, supra note 76, at 741 (reviewing dismissals of school finance litigation in
state highest courts based on the lack of judicially manageable standards).
188. See Clayton Gillette, Reconstructing Local Control of School Finance: A Cautionary
Note, 25 CAP. U. L. REv. 37, (1996) (quoting MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14;
MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; NJ. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1; OHIo CoNsT. art. VI, § 2; S.D.
CONST. art. VI, § 15; W. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1; WYo. CONST. art. VII, § 9; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI,
§ 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, each of which contains one or more of
these terms). Although these are certainly good examples of nebulous terms of constitutional
duty, even better examples exist among the states. See GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("adequate"), VA.
CONST. art. VIII, § I ("high quality"); WASH. CONST. art. IX, § I ("ample provision"); FLA. CONST.
art. IX, § 1("uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality").
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Contemporaneous with the passage of the amendment, scholars of
education finance were engaged in an ongoing debate over judicially
manageable standards in school finance adequacy cases.'" One proposed
solution to the problem of indeterminacy was for courts to use legisla-
tively developed content learning standards as the baseline for deter-
mining what sort of an education qualifies as "adequate."'" The Oregon
amendment went one step further and explicitly established this
approach in the constitutional text. It appears that the hope of the
reformers was that, in future litigation challenging the adequacy of edu-
cation spending, the existence of a substantive definition of adequacy-
sufficient funding to allow for the achievement of state-adopted content
learning standards-would allow a suit to succeed where the previous
suits based on equity had failed in the face of judicial deference to leg-
islatively determined educational policy goals.
In addition to the substance-based alteration of the education article,
however, the Oregon amendment added process-based requirements.
Specifically, each year, the constitution now requires the Oregon
Legislature to publicly certify that its appropriated amounts are suffi-
cient to achieve the constitutionally mandated substantive require-
ments."' This "proof of compliance" procedural requirement by itself
simply adds some teeth to the more important substantive requirement
to adequately fund the system. However, the measure does not exist in
isolation. Rather, the Legislature is provided with an alternative proce-
dure. If funding falls short of the substantive requirements in any given
year, the Legislature must publicly explain why such underfunding is
necessary that year, as well as what impacts such underfunding may
have on Oregon's school system.'92 This "shaming" accountability meas-
ure seems intended to incentivize compliance through the threat of pub-
lic disapproval, but it also provides the Legislature with a constitutional
escape hatch. The negative implication of the "shaming" requirement is
189. This debate arguably began with an article by Professor McUsic, who was among the
first to suggest using state content standards to determine the extent of each state funding duties.
Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28 HARV. J.
ON LEGIs. 307 (1991).
190. See William E. Thro, A New Approach to State Constitutional Analysis in School
Finance Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL. 525, 544-45 (1998) (suggesting that judicial use of legisla-
tively developed standards to define the constitutional duty would mute separation of powers
concerns).
191. OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 8(1).
192. Id.
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that the Legislature is not actually under any duty to adequately fund the
system, as long as it publicly explains its failure to do so.
In fact, when the provision became the subject of a school finance
adequacy lawsuit several years after its adoption, this "escape hatch"
interpretation is exactly the interpretation that the Oregon Supreme
Court gave to it.'" The plaintiffs in the case asked both for a declaration
that the Legislature had failed to comply with Section 8(1)'s substantive
funding requirements, and for an injunction requiring funding to be
increased to a level that would allow for the achievement of the state
content standards.'" The court had no problem determining that the
funding levels provided fell short of the standard established in Section
8(1), and the declaration issued.' But the court nevertheless declined to
issue the requested injunction to increase funding, holding that the exis-
tence of the explanation requirement was a clear indication that under-
funding in some years was specifically contemplated by the terms of
Section 8(1), and thus was constitutionally permissible.'"
Considering the Oregon amendment in light of the court's interpreta-
tion, the proponents of the amendment succeeded in giving content to
the nebulous terms of the more general education clause in Section 3 of
the Oregon Constitution,'" but they also succeeded in rendering any
funding duties established in the education article completely discre-
tionary. Thus, a process-based accountability mechanism intended to
incentivize the fulfillment of the substance-based funding requirement
was ultimately read to undercut it. In at least one important way, then,
this case illustrates the power of constitutionally mandated procedures in
the minds of judges.
Reviewing the examples above from Florida, California, and Oregon
reveals that all three states experienced amendment efforts focused
mostly on ensuring substantive policy results that would ordinarily be
the focus of legislative policy making, and ensuring these results as a
matter of state constitutional law. In Florida, the proponents of three sep-
arate amendments sought to (1) increase the legislative duty to allocate
state funds to education; (2) lower class sizes; and (3) expand the scope
193. Pendleton Sch. Dist. v. State, 200 P.3d 133 (Or. 2009).
194. Id. at 136-37.
195. Id. at 141.
196. Id. at 141-42.
197. OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 ("The Legislative Assembly shall provide by law for the estab-
lishment of a uniform, and general system of Common schools.").
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of time during which the state is obligated to provide free schooling to
those who choose it, all as a matter of constitutional law.
As I have pointed out, the first two of these do not portend much in
the way of securing the benefits sought by their proponents. The Florida
court has yet to repudiate its justiciability holding from Chiles, and the
language added to the education article in 1998 is unlikely to change the
character of the court's objections.198 The class size measure has already
been placed in danger of being partially repealed only one year after full
implementation, only narrowly surviving this challenge.'" The pre-
school measure has been successfully implemented, but it still has
removed from the legislative process the discretion that the legislature
would otherwise have to offer more limited preschool programs to more
needy students and families and to use any savings to prevent larger sys-
temic negative impacts to the educational system that may result from
unforeseen economic crises or natural disasters (a problem that the class
size amendment presents, as well).
California's voters sought at first to constitutionally limit local taxa-
tion to levels that they saw as more reasonable and to prevent state or
local tax increases from being imposed absent overwhelming political
support. A different set of reformers then sought to preserve current lev-
els of school funding as a constitutional minimum. Each of these pres-
ents the same sort of substantive freezing of the policy making process
that is evident in the two Florida amendments adopted in 2002.
Moreover, Propositions 13 and 98 appear to work at cross-purposes with
each other-one ensuring that spending does not increase over time, and
the other ensuring that it does, at least if general state wealth increases -
revealing that unrestricted or unthinking substance-based specification
within a state constitution can become self-defeating over time.
Finally, the Oregon amendment illustrates the preference ingrained
within the judiciary for the enforcement of procedural requirements that
limit the impact of substance-based specification attempts. The voters in
Oregon attempted to greatly reduce the substantive discretion of the leg-
islature in educational policy making, and to incentivize compliance par-
tially through shaming. But the Oregon Supreme Court read in that
shaming provision an implied authorization to the legislature to decide
198. It may be that these objections no longer exist, since the entire membership of the court
has changed since Chiles was issued, but that is, of course, mere speculation.
199. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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on its own whether or not to comply with the substance-based require-
ment intended by the amendment.
A reasonable conclusion in the face of these examples is that substance-
based specifications enacted in state constitutions to address narrow con-
cerns related to the political exigencies of the day present a substantial risk
of unintended negative consequences, and indeed may ultimately work
against their intended purposes. A more reasoned approach in the face of
perceived abuses of legislative discretion, I will argue, is to eschew
attempts at predetermining the substantive policy conclusions of the leg-
islative process, and to instead adopt as amendments (or even to design
into newly adopted or revised state constitutions) provisions that provide
for reasonable, process-based specifications directed at encouraging the
thoughtful exercise of legislative discretion. The Louisiana Constitution
was amended in 1987 to include such a provision within its education arti-
cle, and I discuss this provision below.
III. THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION OF 1974
In 1973, after fifty-odd years under a state constitution that had
become larded with hundreds of mostly trivial and partisan amendments,
the Legislature of Louisiana called a constitutional convention.200 The
resulting document had many of the same features identified above as
common to state constitutions.2 0' The initial education article was no
exception. It resembled the education articles of most other states, com-
bining a vague, but purportedly directive legislative duty provision with
several more bureaucratic provisions concerning the structure of the
education apparatus of the executive branch. Certain features of this ini-
tial education article merit discussion.
A. The 1974 Education Article
The 1974 version of the Louisiana Constitution's education article
contained the type of basic, general mandate that one would expect to
find at varying levels of intensity in every state constitution in the coun-
200. See Carleton, supra note 5, at 563-66 (recounting the developments leading up to the
constitutional convention of 1973).
201. See supra, Part II.A.
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try.202 In addition to this general mandate, though, Section 13(B) of the
education article explicitly required the legislature to provide a level of
funding necessary to achieve a "minimum foundation program of edu-
cation in all public elementary and secondary schools."203 This mandate
was augmented by statutory enactments requiring the state Board of
Elementary and Secondary Education2 0 to develop a proposed school
funding distribution formula each year based on its own cost studies and
submit it to the legislature.205
In many states, the legislature delegates to the state education board or
some other designee the responsibility to operationalize the provisions
of the state constitution by devising and promulgating through statute a
state education funding distribution formula.2 0 Education finance distri-
bution formulas contain a series of equations intended to reflect the
varying cost functions associated with the financing of an education sys-
tem. The goal is to allocate state funds proportionally to state needs.
These formulas also have the function of determining the percentage of
education funding that will be supplied directly from state revenues and
those that must be raised locally, typically through property taxation. As
one might surmise, through the balancing of local cost factors, student
characteristics, and comparative property wealth, these formulas can
quickly become very complex."
Once a formula is constructed, the next task is typically to determine
the absolute amounts of funding that will be plugged into it each year.
These absolute amounts are typically expressed as a default cost per
pupil or per educational unit in the education system, to which the for-
mula may apply certain "weights" to reflect the higher and lower costs
of educating particular classifications of students.20 Each state has a dif-
202. See LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("The legislature shall provide for the education of the
people of the state and shall establish and maintain a public educational system."); see also id.,
pmbl. ("The goal of the public educational system is to provide learning environments and expe-
riences, at all stages of human development, that are humane, just, and designed to promote
excellence in order that every individual may be afforded an equal opportunity to develop to his
full potential.").
203. See Louisiana Assoc. of Educ. v. Edwards, 521 So. 2d 390,390 (1988) (quoting the pre-
amendment text of Section 13(B) of Article VIII of the Louisiana Constitution).
204. Hereinafter, the "BESE," the "board," or the "state board."
205. LA. REv. STAT. § § 17:22(2), (2)(d) (1987).
206. See WOOD, supra note 45, at 19 (introducing the idea of formula-based education
finance distribution plans).
207. Id. at 19-39 (discussing the varieties of state finance distribution formulas).
208. Id. at 33-34. Most school finance formulas attempt to incorporate the competing con-
ceptions of horizontal equity, the provision of equal funds per similarly situated pupil or unit, and
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ferent approach to determining the absolute amount of per-pupil fund-
ing, but the determination in every state is primarily and ultimately a
legislative function.20 9
Some states conduct legislative hearings, others appoint task forces,
still others conduct internal studies through the state board to arrive at a
number. Sometimes, legislative bodies even consider independently
contracted "cost studies" to determine what providing an adequate pub-
lic education system costs and base their ultimate funding provisions on
such studies.2 10 The most basic strategy, which has fallen out of favor of
late, is to begin with what was appropriated the previous year-or to
average the amounts appropriated statewide the previous year-and add
some percentage to it.2 1' Importantly, regardless of the approach, in near-
ly every state the authorization for this formula development process is
entirely statutory, and the state constitution merely imposes on the leg-
islature the general duty to fund the system (based on whatever quality-
based terms that this duty may encompass).2 12
Pursuant to such a statutory procedure, prior to the 1986-87 school
year the Louisiana Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (the
"BESE") submitted its proposed formula and budget for the state school
system, arriving .at a total requested state funding level of $974.5 mil-
lion."' In the face of a financial crisis and the accompanying revenue
declines, the state legislature balked at this number and instead appro-
priated $934.5 million."1 Governor Edwin Edwards also issued execu-
tive orders that would have further reduced funding by five percent, but
these orders were never implemented.215 In response, the Louisiana
Association of Educators filed suit seeking both a declaration that the
legislature was possessed of a constitutional duty to fund the state's
school system at the level requested by the BESE, and an injunction
vertical equity, the provision of sufficient funds to equalize opportunity for students based on dif-
fering needs, such that differing levels of funding are provided for differently situated pupils or
units. Id. at 18.
209. Id. at 12.
210. See, e.g., R. CRAIG WOOD & BRUCE BAKER, FINANCING MISSOURI'S PUBLIC
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS: FINAL REPORT (R.C. Wood & Assoc. 2004), available at
http://www.rcwoodassoc.com/pdf/missouri.pdf (last visited July 6, 2010).
211. See WOOD, supra note 45, at 72-73 (discussing average expenditure methods for deter-
mining educational funding levels).
212. See supra, Part I.B. (discussing the differing state constitutional education provisions).
213. Edwards, 521 So.2d at 391.
214. Id.; Jackie Ducote, The Education Article of the Louisiana Constitution, 62 LA. L. REV.
117, 132 (2001).
215. Ducote, supra note 214, at 132.
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ordering the legislature to fully fund the minimum foundation program
formula the BESE proposed in 1986.216
B. The Edwards Case and the Response
The state defendants, which included not only Governor Edwards, but
also John Alario, the Speaker of the Louisiana House, Sammy Nunez,
the President of the Louisiana Senate, and state Attorney General
William Guste, initially moved to dismiss the action on the grounds of
failure to state a claim, lack of standing, and non-justiciability.2 17 The
district trial court deferred these motions but ultimately heard them,
along with arguments on the merits, on cross-motions for summary
judgment, ruling for the plaintiffs.218 The court's order both granted the
declaration sought by the plaintiffs and enjoined the legislature to
increase educational funding by $42,439,270, to the level proposed in
the BESE's formula.2 9
On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the legislature,
under the education article, was possessed of the "sole responsibility"
both to determine the funds required to provide the constitutionally
required MFP, and to provide those funds .220 The court explained that the
function of the distribution formula was simply to distribute the legisla-
tively appropriated funds equitably, and that the courts therefore lacked
the power to require the legislature to meet the proposed funding levels
of the distribution formula.22' The direction of this ruling conflicted with
the direction taken in several opinions issued in other states in the late
1980s .222 The most notable of these was the Kentucky Supreme Court's
216. Edwards, 521 So.2d at 391; Ducote, supra note 214 at 132.
217. Edwards, 521 So.2d at 391.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 394.
221. Id.
222. See Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (1989) (holding that the
entire state system of education in Kentucky violates the education article, due to system-wide
inadequacies in spending); Helena Elementary School Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont.
1989) ("We conclude that as a result of the failure to adequately fund the Foundation Program,
forcing an excessive reliance on permissive and voted levies, the State has failed to provide a sys-
tem of quality public education granting to each student the equality of educational opportunity
guaranteed under Art. X, Sec. 1, Mont. Const. We specifically affirm that portion of the District
Court's Conclusion of Law 17 which holds that the spending disparities among the State's school
districts translate into a denial of equality of educational opportunity. We hold that the 1985-86
system of funding public elementary and secondary schools in Montana is in violation of Article
X, Section I of the Montana Constitution."); Edgewood Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391,
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ruling in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., a decision that most
observers credit with ushering in the "adequacy" wave of school finance
litigation.2 3 In Rose, the court, faced with a case similar to Edwards,
held the entire state school system unconstitutional, due to system-wide
inadequacies and inequities in resources.224 In contrast, in Edwards, the
court held that the issue could not be decided judicially, due to the "sole
responsibility" for educational funding residing with the legislature."
Before it was even decided, the Edwards case catalyzed an effort
among educator groups in Louisiana to lobby the legislature for a pro-
posed constitutional amendment.2 6 This effort was successful, and in
1987, prior to the district court's initial decision in the case, the amend-
ment was placed on the ballot for voter approval. 27 The measure passed,
and the constitutional provision that was the subject of the Edwards case
was altered, arguably nullifying the Louisiana Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the state constitution before it was even handed down.228
As a result of this successful amendment effort, unique among the
states, Louisiana now makes a significant portion of its school finance
formula development process a matter of explicit constitutional text.229
Under amended Section 13(B), the State Board of Elementary and
397 (Tex. 1989) ("We hold that the state's school financing system is neither financially efficient
nor efficient in the sense of providing for a "general diffusion of knowledge" statewide, and there-
fore that it violates article VII, section 1 of the Texas Constitution. Efficiency does not require a
per capita distribution, but it also does not allow concentrations of resources in property-rich
school districts that are taxing low when property-poor districts that are taxing high cannot gener-
ate sufficient revenues to meet even minimum standards.").
223. See, e.g., Scott R. Bauries, Rights, Remedies, and Rose, 98 Ky. LJ. 703, 703-04 (2010)
(explaining the widely-held view that Rose began a new wave of litigation dominated by con-
cerns over the adequacy of spending).
224. Rose, 790 S.W.2d 186.
225. The ruling, though, was not one of complete non-justiciability, as the plaintiffs in
Edwards did not challenge whether the program ultimately funded by the legislature provided a
"minimum foundation." The challenge was based on whether the legislature was required to fully
fund the plan proposed by the BESE, an executive branch agency. Thus, the court's ruling was
based on the separation of powers, but it resolved the issue in favor of the legislature in compar-
ison with the executive branch, rather than with the courts, as would be the case if the issue were
justiciability. Importantly, this arguably leaves the door open for a future adequacy-based chal-
lenge.
226. Melissa Lawrence, Comment, Constitutional Revision by Amendment-A Louisiana
Tradition, 51 LA. L. REv. 849, 858-59 (1991); Ducote, supra note 214 at 132.
227. La. Acts 948 (1987); Ducote, supra note 214, at 132.
228. The amendment won voter approval on November 21, 1987, becoming effective on
December 24, 1987, and the court issued its opinion in Edwards two months later on February
29, 1988. See Edwards, 521 So. 2d at 390; Ducote, supra note 214, at 132.
229. See LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 13(B) (providing for a specific allocation of powers in
developing an absolute funding amount each year and setting the previous year's funding amount
as the default in the case of impasse).
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Secondary Education must conduct an internal study to determine the
cost of providing a "minimum foundation program" of education, con-
struct a formula for distributing the funds to school districts "equitably,"
and arrive at a total level of proposed funding for the year.230 These
BESE duties-now constitutionally mandated-are similar to those
once imposed only by statute in Louisiana."'
Once those tasks are completed, the board submits its formula, com-
plete with spending levels plugged in, to the legislature for approval.232
The legislature has three choices at this point. It can (1) approve the for-
mula as submitted and fund the system at the levels reflected in the for-
mula; (2) send the formula back to the board for revision; or (3) send the
formula back for revision, but include its own proposals for revisions
(e.g., increases or decreases in certain or overall funding levels). 233The
legislature may not simply overrule the BESE and decide unilaterally
how and at what level to fund the state's schools. The process continues
until the board submits a proposed formula that the legislature approves,
which it then has the absolute duty to fully fund." Importantly, if the
board and the legislature reach an impasse, then the state constitution
also mandates that the formula on which the board and the legislature
most recently reached agreement, including the levels of funding used,
becomes the default formula for the current year."
Unlike the amendments made in other states in response to school
finance litigation, which largely have imposed substance-based funding,
programmatic, and resource requirements, the amendment secured by
Louisiana reformers has a decidedly process-based focus." Comparing
the text of the initial 1974 provision and the current provision reveals
that the two substantive legislative duties found in the initial provision-
the duty to provide funds sufficient to ensure a "minimum foundation
program" and the duty to provide for the "equitable distribution" of the
funds-are preserved."' Added to these substantive legislative duties,
230. LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 13(B).
231. See LA. REv. STAT. §§ 17:22(2), (2)(d) (1987) (placing similar mandates on the BESE).
232. LA. CONST. art. VIII, §13(B).
233. Id.
234. Id. This requirement, more than any other imposed by the amendment was a direct
rebuke to the Edwards court.
235. Id.
236. See id. While the amended text of Section 13(B) does contain substance-based ele-
ments, such as a soft floor for funding in the event of impasse, the tenor of the text is directed at
the negotiation and collaboration that must occur between the legislature and the BESE. See infra
note 238 (setting forth the initial provision and the amended provision for comparison).
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however, are constitutionally mandated procedures for fulfilling such
duties.
The amended provision mandates negotiation and collaboration
between the BESE and the legislature, and it specifies the order in which
such negotiation shall occur. In the form of the typical negotiation give-
and-take, the BESE goes first by proposing a formula, including spend-
ing requirements. The legislature has several responsive options at its
disposal, including acceptance, rejection, and counter-offer. The obvious
goal is to allow the different governmental units to come to an agree-
ment based on reasoned deliberation and the consideration of alternative
viewpoints, but the text also reveals the assumption that this may not
always be possible. Thus, the text adds a motivational element-a pro-
vision defaulting spending and distribution to the previous year's levels
if the parties cannot agree, what can be referred to as a "soft floor,"
because the legislature and the BESE may at any time agree to set fund-
ing levels below it.238
237. Compare LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 13(B) (amended 1987) (1974) ("The legislature shall
appropriate funds sufficient to insure Isic] a minimum foundation program of education in all
public elementary and secondary schools. The funds appropriated shall be equitably allocated to
parish and city school systems according to formulas adopted by the State Board of Elementary
and Secondary Education and approved by the legislature prior to making the appropriation.")
with LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 13(B) (1987) ("The State Board of Elementary and Secondary
Education, or its successor, shall annually develop and adopt a formula which shall be used to
determine the cost of a minimum foundation program of education in all public elementary and
secondary schools as well as to equitably allocate the funds to parish and city school systems.
Such formula shall provide for a contribution by every city and parish school system. Prior to
approval of the formula by the legislature, the legislature may return the formula adopted by the
board to the board and may recommend to the board an amended formula for consideration by
the board and submission to the legislature for approval. The legislature shall annually appropri-
ate funds sufficient to fully fund the current cost to the state of such a program as determined by
applying the approved formula in order to insure a minimum foundation of education in all pub-
lic elementary and secondary schools. Neither the governor nor the legislature may reduce such
appropriation, except that the governor may reduce such appropriation using means provided in
the act containing the appropriation provided that any such reduction is consented to in writing
by two-thirds of the elected members of each house of the legislature. The funds appropriated
shall be equitably allocated to parish and city school systems according to the formula as adopt-
ed by the State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education, or its successor, and approved by
the legislature prior to making the appropriation. Whenever the legislature fails to approve the
formula most recently adopted by the board, or its successor, the last formula adopted by the
board, or its successor, and approved by the legislature shall be used for the determination of the
cost of the minimum foundation program and for the allocation of funds appropriated.").
238. 1 refer to the default spending level as a "soft floor" because it does not place an
absolute lower limit on expenditures. Compare Mo. CONsT. art. IX, § 3(b) ("IlIn no case shall
there be set apart less than twenty-five percent of the state revenue, exclusive of interest and sink-
ing fund, to be applied annually to the support of the free public schools."). See also supra, notes
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Importantly, the roles of substance and process are switched in
Louisiana in comparison with Oregon. As discussed, Oregon has a sub-
stantive funding requirement incentivized by a procedural shaming
device. In contrast, Louisiana has a procedural policy development
requirement incentivized by a substantive spending floor. It is clear that
the Louisiana reformers knew, based on past experience, that the BESE
would generally seek to increase expenditures, but that the legislature
would sometimes seek to decrease expenditures, so the soft floor placed
in the amended text signals to both parties that recalcitrance will not
allow them to achieve their goals-thus motivating the parties to nego-
tiate in good faith. However, unlike the reciprocal Oregon provision, the
soft floor does not have the effect of absolving the entities of their
responsibilities. On the contrary, it incentivizes their performance. As a
bonus, the soft floor-also seems intended to hold harmless the students
and local educational agencies in the state in the event of true political
impasse or apathy.
Such process specification has the virtue of being clear and easy to
understand, and it may have merit on that basis alone. However, provi-
sions mandating procedures that must be followed in fulfilling specific
affirmative legislative obligations are unprecedented in state constitu-
tionalism." Accordingly, the question becomes whether such process
specification is likely to be more effective in promoting good social pol-
icy than the more substance-based specifications imposed in Florida,
California, and Oregon.2" A related inquiry is whether such process
specification yields a better prognosis for judicial review than its sub-
stance-based alternatives. Below, based on these inquiries, I present both
a general and a situational defense of the types of requirements imposed
through the Louisiana amendment.
150-154 and accompanying text (discussion of Proposition 98/111's "hard floor" in California,
which the legislature cannot set funding below). If the Louisiana legislature and the BESE were
to agree to lower spending from one year to the next, the state constitution would not stand in the
way, but in cases of true impasse, the default spending level operates as a floor.
239. As discussed above, state constitutions contain many procedural requirements for pur-
suing policy in general, see supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text, but none pegged to the
fulfillment of specific affirmative obligations.
240. Recall that the process-based limitations imposed in the Oregon Constitution all oper-
ate after the substantive policy decision has been made. See supra notes 184-192 and accompa-
nying text. In contrast, as explained in this Part, the process-based limitations in the Louisiana
Constitution govern how the substantive policy decision is to be made.
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IV. IN DEFENSE OF PROCESS SPECIFICATION
I present two cases for process-based specification here. The general
case is based on the differences between state and federal constitutions
in relation to judicial review and the separation of powers. I contend that
process specification serves these interests at the state level in ways that
substance specification would never be able to serve them.
The situational case is premised on the current situation in New
Orleans, which makes it fortuitous that process specification is used in
the Louisiana Constitution, both for reasons relating to predictability and
for reasons relating to possible school finance litigation. Based on these
justifications, I conclude that, if used properly, process specification has
the potential both to protect each branch's prerogatives and to allow for
meaningful check on each branch's exercises of power.
A. The General Case: Process Specification and Education Reform
One of the goals of constitution-making is the anticipation of political
conflicts, and the protection of the people and the existing government
should such conflicts (expected or unexpected) arise."' The federal
Constitution approaches this function by establishing checks and bal-
ances, but also by leaving the boundaries between the powers of each
branch somewhat malleable and indeterminate-what most would refer
to as a "functionalist" approach to the separation of powers.-42
In contrast, most state constitutions approach the inevitability of con-
flict between the branches by specifying a very strict approach to the
separation of powers-what most would term a "formalist" approach.243
Drafters have often included in state constitutions very explicit prohibi-
tions against the exercise of one branch's powers by the members of the
other branches.2' This approach attempts to forestall conflict by holding
each branch's sphere of responsibility inviolable by the other branch-
241. See Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crises, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 707,
714 (2009) ("Disagreement and conflict are natural features of politics. The goal of constitutions
is to manage them within acceptable boundaries.").
242. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers
Questions A Foolish Inconsistency, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488 (1987) (outlining the differences
between formalist and functionalist approaches).
243. See Bauries, supra note 76 (distinguishing formalist from functionalist approaches to
the separation of powers and explaining that, textually, most state constitutions appear to favor
the formalist approach).
244. Id. (reviewing the formalist state constitutional provisions).
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es. 245 In particular, the fact that strict separation of the powers of the
branches is textually mandated makes it difficult to argue that such sep-
aration was not intended. But this approach might have the unintended
effect of exacerbating conflict. Assuming that the general spheres of
responsibility for each branch are well-defined, the formalist approach
provides an incentive for a recalcitrant branch to remain recalcitrant,
knowing that neither of the other branches may force it to budge.
A better approach, however, would seem to be textually mandating
some amount of power-sharing, thus combining the formalist tendencies
of state constitutions with the functionalist realities of policy making.
The Louisiana education article does this by imposing the negotiation
process on the legislative branch and the executive branch together.
True, the legislative branch has the ultimate power to accept or reject
any idea offered by the BESE, but the default spending floor gives this
power limits, and these limits actually incentivize good faith negotia-
tion.
Along with the separation of powers, another important consideration is
that state constitutions exist both to enable and to limit the making of pub-
lic policy.' These functions are best supported where the constitution pre-
serves the discretion of the policy making branches as to which policies to
adopt in pursuit of proper legislative objects. This flexibility in determin-
ing the substance of state policy, however, need not require complete flex-
ibility in the process of lawmaking. Additionally, if a state constitution
means to cabin legislative discretion with an eye toward forestalling the
excesses of entrenched power, it need not predetermine specific policy
outcomes to accomplish this goal. Rather, the constitution can serve these
goals equally well by calling for thoughtful and good-faith legislative
deliberation in the enactment of public policy without mandating particu-
lar policy outcomes. One useful way to do this would seem to be the adop-
tion of a process similar to the one set forth in Section 13(B) of the
Louisiana education article, which fosters deliberative policy making by
forcing two branches into dialogue with one another.
245. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. III, § 43 ("In the government of this state, except in the instances
in this Constitution hereinafter expressly directed or permitted, the legislative department shall
never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the
legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a government of laws
and not of men.").
246. See TARR, supra note 9, at 7-8 (describing the functions of state constitutional enu-
merations of power).
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Finally, process specification also serves the related goal of support-
ing a states-specific approach to judicial review, particularly in school
finance litigation. As discussed above, the biggest stumbling blocks for
education finance litigation plaintiffs have been the lack of "judicially
manageable standards," either in interpreting the "nebulous" terms of
state constitutional education clauses, or in fashioning remedies for edu-
cational inadequacy.24 7 Because it takes the substantive policy question
off the judicial table, process-based specification has the potential to
provide such standards. In enforcing process-based provisions, courts
have little nebulous content, if any, to construe, but they do have stan-
dards that can be enforced, thus preserving the judiciary's role as a check
on legislative inaction.
Moreover, at least some evidence exists that the public prefers the
enforcement of process specifications to the enforcement of more nebu-
lous substantive provisions. In Nevada, the constitution has both a gen-
eral education clause setting forth a more nebulous duty to provide for
education,2" and two specific limitations on policy making in general-
a supermajority requirement for legislative tax increase measures,249 and
a balanced budget requirement.2"o In 1996, the Nevada legislature passed
a budget, which included provisions specifying educational funding lev-
els, a measure which only required a simple majority, but which would
have required tax increases if the budget were to be balanced that year.25'
The legislature could not come to terms such that a supermajority would
247. See Bauries, supra note 76, at 746-47 (discussing the influence of separation of pow-
ers principles on judicial decision making in school finance litigation).
248. See NEv. CONST. art. 11, § I ("The legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the
promotion of intellectual, literary, scientific, mining, mechanical, agricultural, and moral
improvements, and also provide for a superintendent of public instruction and by law prescribe
the manner of appointment, term of office and the duties thereof."); NEv. CONST. art. 11, § 2 ("The
legislature shall provide for a uniform system of common schools, by which a school shall be
established and maintained in each school district at least six months in every year.").
249. NEv. CONST. art. IV, § 18(2) ("Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, an affir-
mative vote of not fewer than two-thirds of the members elected to each house is necessary to
pass a bill or joint resolution which creates, generates, or increases any public revenue in any
form, including but not limited to taxes, fees, assessments and rates, or changes in the computa-
tion bases for taxes, fees, assessments and rates.").
250. NEV. CONST. art. IX, § 2 ("The legislature shall provide by law for an annual tax suffi-
cient to defray the estimated expenses of the state for each fiscal year; and whenever the expens-
es of any year exceed the income, the legislature shall provide for levying a tax sufficient, with
other sources of income, to pay the deficiency, as well as the estimated expenses of such ensuing
year or two years.").
251. Guinn v. Legislature, 71 P.3d 1269, 1273 (Nev. 2003) ("Guinn I"); see also Guinn v.
Legislature, 76 P.3d 22, 34 (Nev. 2003) ("Guinn II") (denying the defendants' petition for rehear-
ing).
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be willing to vote for the revenue measure, so the schools remained
unfunded well past the normal deadline.252
As a result, Governor Guinn petitioned for a writ of mandamus against
the state legislature to force it to fund the education expenditures that had
already been passed into law as part of the state budget.253 Ultimately, in
Guinn v. Legislature, the Nevada Supreme Court held that, in cases of con-
flict between substantive and procedural provisions, substantive provisions
are given favor. Based on this principle, the court held that the supermajor-
ity requirement for tax increases would have to yield to the substantive
requirement to fund the schools.2S As a result, the court issued a writ of
mandamus to the legislature to vote on the tax increases by simple majori-
ty, rather than by the constitutionally mandated supermajority.255
However, only a few years later, an election resulted in an overwhelm-
ing popular vote to remove one of the justices in the Guinn majority, an
outcome which decisively changed the court's political leanings.2 5 Soon
after, the Guinn decision was explicitly overruled in Nevadans for
Nevada v. Beers.257 The takeaway from Beers is that procedural protec-
tions cannot be lightly read out of a state constitution, and that state
judges-particularly elected judges-may be on safer ground in enforc-
ing procedurally specific provisions than they are in enforcing substan-
tively specific provisions.2 58 All of this counsels in favor of the Louisiana
approach, but is this approach likely to bear fruit in New Orleans?
B. The Situational Case: School Reform in New Orleans
1. Katrina, Rita, The Great Recession, and the New Orleans Laboratory
In August of 2005, Hurricane Katrina, one of the strongest hurricanes
on record, tore through the Gulf of Mexico, weakened slightly to
252. Guinn 1, 71 P.3d at 1273-74.
253. Id. at 1272.
254. Id. at 1275 ("When a procedural requirement that is general in nature prevents funding
for a basic, substantive right, the procedure must yield.").
255. Id. at 1276.
256. See Bronson D. Bills, A Penny for the Court's Thoughts? The High Price of Judicial
Elections, 3 Nw. U. J. L. Soc. Pot'Y 29, 50-53 (2008) (outlining the effects of the Guinn deci-
sion, one of which was the ousting of a concurring justice, who was replaced by a much less qual-
ified opponent after a misleading campaign by special interest groups opposed to the Guinn
court's suspension of the supermajority requirement).
257. Nevadans for Nevada v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339 (Nev. 2006).
258. See Bills, supra note 256, at 50-52. For a general critique of the Guinn decision as
wrongheaded, see generally Steve R, Johnson, Supermajority Provisions, Guinn v. Legislature
and a Flawed Constitutional Structure, 4 NEv. LJ. 491 (2004).
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Category Four status, and slammed into the Mississippi shoreline.2 S9 The
western side of the storm sent high winds and storm surge up the
Mississippi River into New Orleans, which was protected from flooding
by an elaborate system of levies-until the levies broke. The resulting
flood wiped whole neighborhoods from the city map and paralyzed pub-
lic services for months. It also required the evacuation of nearly every
non-rescue-oriented person in New Orleans and either destroyed or ren-
dered unsafe for use most school buildings. 60 As a result, the city's
school system ground to a halt, and the children who did not leave town
were left with only spotty opportunities for public education until the
city could assess and respond to the damage.26 '
A few weeks later, as the city was attempting to rebuild, Hurricane
Rita administered another dose of wind and water-based natural fury,
temporarily stopping-and permanently compounding-the Katrina-
based rebuilding effort.262 Three years after that, the U.S. economy near-
ly collapsed, unemployment soared, and state tax revenues began to
decline.263 Now, with the fifth anniversary of Katrina's arrival in the
recent past, Louisiana again must weather an environmental catastro-
phe-this one caused by human factors-and the effects of this latest
harm have yet to be fully calculated.2" Each one of these successive
harms has directly affected both the funding and the operations of the
259. See Kristi L. Bowman, Rebuilding Schools, Rebuilding Communities: The Civic Role
of Mississippi's Public Schools After Hurricane Katrina, 77 Miss. L. 711,712 (2008) (correct-
ly pointing out that the storm actually made landfall in Mississippi, not Louisiana, and that the
damage in Mississippi was so extensive that, had New Orleans not flooded, the disaster story
would have centered on Mississippi).
260. Paul T. O'Neil & Renita K. Thukral, The Unique System of Charter Schools in New
Orleans After Hurricane Katrina: Distinctive Structure, Familiar Challenges, 11 LoY. J. PUB.
INr. L. 319, 320 (2010).
261. Sonja Ralston Elder, Adding Autonomous Schools to New Orleans' Menu of School
Choice, 11 Lov. J. PUB. Iwr. L. 389, 396-97 (2010).
262. See generally R. W. Kates, C. E. Colten, S. Laska, & S. P. Leatherman, Reconstruction
of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina: A Research Perspective, PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. SCI.
(August 29, 2006), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/103/40/14653.full (last visited May
2,2010).
263. See, e.g., Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Government Seizes WaMu and Sells Some
Assets, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/
business/26wamu.htmi (reporting the failure of Washington Mutual, to that date the largest bank
failure in history, and one of the harbingers of the coming recession).
264. See Elizabeth Weise & Doyle Rice, How bad could BP oil spill get for the Gulf and the
nation?, USA TODAY (June 9, 2010), available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/sciencel
environment/2010-06-09-lAoilhowbad09_CVN.htm (last visited June 23, 2010) (speculating
about the extent of the harm).
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New Orleans public schools, and each has compounded the effects of the
previous harms.
Following Katrina, and continuing to this day, the leaders of Orleans
Parish, along with state political leaders, local activists, and interested
parents, have reconstituted the school system in a way unprecedented
among major American cities.265 The city schools have been reformulat-
ed into a system of districts and direct educational providers, each of
which subsists on public funding, but each of which operates under dif-
fering rules and standards. The Orleans Parish School Board ("OPSB")
continues to operate only four traditional public schools, along with sev-
eral charter schools.266
Almost half of the public schools formerly operated by the OPSB are
now operated by what has been termed the Recovery School District."7
The Recovery School District was actually authorized by way of state
constitutional amendment prior to Hurricane Katrina to enable state
takeovers of schools that were deemed "academically in crisis.
Hurricane Katrina allowed the Louisiana legislature to use the Recovery
School District to accomplish an expanded mission-to recover not only
the previous "crisis" schools placed under its jurisdiction, but also other
schools affected by Hurricane Katrina and subsequent events.269 The
Recovery School District, like the OPSB, contains both traditional pub-
lic schools and charter schools.2 o
The result of this reorganization has been that about half of the public
schools in New Orleans are now charter schools. 271 This proportion far
surpasses the proportion in the next closest comparable metropolitan
area.27 2 Thus, it presents a laboratory of experimentation for alternative
265. O'Neil & Thukral, supra note 260, at 320-21.
266. Michael Schwam-Baird & Laura Mogg, Is Education Reform in New Orleans
Working?: A Few facts Swimming in a Sea of Unknowns, 11 Loy. J. PUB. Iwr. L. 163, 178 (2010).
267. Id. at 179.
268. Id. at 165; see also LA. REv. STAT. § 17:10.7 (implementing, in part, the constitutional
amendment and providing this term as label for academically underperforming schools).
269. Id. at 168.
270. Id. at 169.
271. Mark C. Weber, Special Education from the (Damp) Ground Up: Children with
Disabilities in a Charter School-Dependent Educational System, 11 Loy. J. PUB. Iwr. L. 217, 252
(2010).
272. See Lisa Gartner, D.C. Exodus to Charters Among Highest in US., WAsH. EXAMINER
(Nov. 2, 2010), available at: http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/local/D C_-exodus-to-
charters-among-highest-in-US_-1418198-106557253.html#ixzzl4RTO48kj (last visited Nov.
4, 2010) ("Thirty-eight percent of D.C. Public Schools students are enrolled in public charter
schools, putting the school district behind only New Orleans's towering 61 percent.").
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models of schooling, and some of the results of this experimentation
have been encouraging. The system also shows promising signs of local
support and buy-in, indicating that it should be maintained, at least for
the time being.
However, this system-like all school systems-is supported by a
funding system. To date, the New Orleans schools have enjoyed funding
increases in every year since Katrina hit.273 This is true even though tax
revenues have declined in most years, and have declined very sharply in
the most recent year-32.8 percent in the first quarter of 2010, as com-
pared with the first quarter of 2009, and since that time, the BP oil spill
disaster has impacted the state's finances and revenues even more.7 In
the face of declining state revenues, these funding increases have been
largely enabled by massive infusions of federal funding-first as disas-
ter relief for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and then as part of The
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 275 following the start of the
Great Recession.276
2. The Coming Funding "Cliff' and the State Constitution
The federal funding currently supporting the New Orleans experiment
will, if nothing changes before then, disappear after the current fiscal
year. This inevitable point has been referred to as the "cliff" because cur-
rent levels of state funding, held artificially high by federal appropria-
tions, will plummet once the federal funding disappears .277 Nearly all
273. Schwam-Baird & Mogg, supra note 266, at 163.
274. Catherine Rampell, The Revenue Picture, State by State, NEW YORK TIMES ECONOMIX
BLDG, June 3, 2010, available at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/the-revenue-
picture-state-by-statel (last visited April 2, 2010) (citing the Rockefeller Institute of
Government).
275. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(Feb. 17, 2009).
276. This term has been commonly used to describe the economic downturn and near col-
lapse that began in 2008 and continues to this day. See, e.g., Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, &
Aysegul Sahin, The Labor Market in the Great Recession, Paper Prepared for Brookings Panel
on Economic Activity, March 18-19, 2010 (version April 15, 2010), at 2, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2010-spring-bpea-papers/
spring2010_elsby.pdf (last visited June 29, 2010) ("The depth and duration of the decline in eco-
nomic activity have led many to refer to the downturn as the Great Recession") (emphasis in orig-
inal).
277. Daniel J. Hurley, F. King Alexander, Rodolfo Arevalo, Nancy Carriulo, Sally Clausen,
& Thomas Haas, The Second Fiscal Crisis: Preparing for the Funding Cliff, PUB. PURPOSE
(Sept./Oct. 2009).
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states face the "cliff," but in Louisiana, its effects will likely be more
pronounced for two reasons.
The first is that the state has subsisted on federal assistance for more
than twice as long as the other states have.278 This fact alone is likely to
make the cliff more politically jarring in Louisiana as the state budget
has benefitted from some form of large-scale federal exigency-based
assistance for more than half of the past decade, while most other states
began receiving such exigency-based help only as of the passage of the
Recovery Act in 2009. However, this fact does not stand alone.
The other reason that the cliff in Louisiana is likely to be higher, steep-
er, and more treacherous is that the education budget in New Orleans has
seen increases every year since Katrina hit due to this federal largesse.279
First targeted to necessary rebuilding and safety measures, the funds
now seem to buoy the expenditure levels of the Recovery School
District's charter division, to the point that Recovery District charters,
according to the most recent study, spent nearly twice as much per pupil
as traditional public schools in the Orleans Parish School District.2 o
With these points in mind, it is worth considering whether the major
amendment to the state legislature's education duties accomplished in
1987 portends a positive or negative influence on the state's ability to
cope with the certain budget reductions to come. The 1987 amendment
to Article VIII, Section 13(B) sought to entrench constitutionally the
power-sharing that had been fairly common before that time, reacting to
the dispute that had developed between the legislature and education
officials as to who possessed the duty to set expenditure levels.28' Based
on the generalized language of legislative duty contained in both Section
13 and Section 1, the main education clause, the Edwards court held that
the duty to determine expenditure levels was exclusively lodged with the
legislature.282 Rather than reverse this determination and lodge the duty
in the executive or judicial branch, the proponents of the amendment to
Section 13(B) sought another approach-one geared toward mutual
deliberation.
However, the amendment actually may have added meaningful con-
tent to the state constitution's distribution of powers provision in a way
278. Schwam-Baird & Mogg, supra note 266, at 163.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Louisiana Ass'n of Educators v. Edwards, 521 So. 2d 390 (1988).
282. Id. at 394.
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that (a) might be enough to forestall future adequacy litigation; or (b)
might be helpful in the event of future adequacy litigation. Louisiana's
distribution of powers clause, like the clauses in many state constitu-
tions, explicitly forbids the members of one branch of government from
exercising any of the powers of the other branches.2 K This highly for-
malistic conception of the separation of powers is quite common among
the states, and it (textually, at least) stands in stark contrast to the
approach primarily followed in the federal courts, referred to as the
functionalist approach." A functionalist approach to the separation of
powers requires reviewing courts to balance the needs of the branches
and to make a determination of whether too much power of one branch
is subsumed by another.285 Where a formalist approach is called for, the
main interpretive quandary is the determination of which powers belong
to which branches." The amendments to Section 13(B) may have
resolved this latter quandary as to educational duties and powers in
Louisiana.
The changes wrought by the 1987 amendment might prove sufficient
to prevent future adequacy litigation from being brought, because the
provision's main import is to eschew power compartmentalization and
to encourage negotiation. Much of educational adequacy litigation
results from the political branches failing to work effectively with each
other, and once a case is brought, political realities may make such col-
laboration even more problematic.' In adequacy litigation that results in
a plaintiff judgment, however, the remedial phase (whether formal or
informal) nearly always involves some dialogue between the legislative
and executive branches (and sometimes the courts, as well).8 Legal
scholars have referred to the role of the courts in such cases as one of
"destabilization," where such destabilization leads to collaborative
reform involving a community of stakeholders in the government and
283. LA. CONST. art. 2, § 2.
284. Bauries, supra note 76, at 737.
285. Id. at 737-38.
286. Id.
287. See Joshua Dunn & Martha Derthick, Adequacy Litigation and the Separation of
Powers, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALs 325 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson ed., The Brookings
Institute 2007) (pointing out that the officials of the executive branch have little incentive to
mount a vigorous defense against educational expenditure increases).
288. See, e.g., Michael Heise, Preliminary Thoughts on the Virtues of Passive Dialogue, 34
AKRON L. REv. 73, 97-98 (2000) (describing the choice that state courts have whether to partici-
pate in the dialogue between the political branches during remediation).
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the populace.2" If these scholars are correct, then what better time to
induce such collaboration than before litigation even occurs? It is possi-
ble that the force of the clear responsibilities set forth in Section 13(B)
could forestall litigation entirely by textually mandating the sort of pro-
cedure that a school finance judgment might explicitly or implicitly
require anyway.
The current reforms in New Orleans also have as their backstop the
constitutional guarantee that the budget will not deadlock, and that if it
does, the prior budget will apply. Education finance suits, for good or ill,
are inherently political events.290 In most cases such suits arise from a
perceived legislative disinvestment in education, either over time, or
more commonly, through decentralization, which results in a lower pro-
portion of educational expenses being funded directly by the state.29'
Louisiana's constitutional provision goes a long way toward preventing
any such state-level disinvestment in any given year because it textual-
ly defaults the state budget to the prior year's spending levels.
Nevertheless, it is certainly still possible that such disinvestment
could occur either in one year or over time if both the legislative and
executive branches were to desire it. That is, even the state constitution's
process-based provisions may not be enough to prevent an actual politi-
cal crisis from occurring in Louisiana once the funding cliff reaches the
state, and New Orleans is likely to bear the brunt of this crisis if it
occurs. The crisis could take the form of a legislative enactment calling
for reductions in spending that does not result from the mandated nego-
tiation process. It could also result from total legislative and executive
inaction or apathy. Or, it could result from collaboration between the leg-
islature and the executive branch to reduce spending due to an agreed
exigency that makes maintenance of current spending levels impossible.
In any case, New Orleans is likely to see significant funding decreases.
If so, then litigation may result, just as it resulted from sharp spending
decreases in 1986. But will the result be the same as the result of the
Edwards litigation? Will judicial deference approaching abstention rule
the day?
289. See, e.g., William S. Koski, The Evolving Role of the Courts in School Reform Twenty
Years After Rose, 98 Ky. L.J. 789, 793 (2010) (describing the courts' role as one of "experimen-
talism," which begins when the courts "destabilize the institutional status quo").
290. Dunn & Derthick, Adequacy Litigation, supra note 287, at 324.
291. See, e.g., Citizens for Strong Sch., Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Educ., Case No. 09-CA-4534
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 2d Jud. Cir. Nov. 18, 2009), Complaint at 5 34 (averring that the state share of edu-
cational spending has recently declined from over sixty percent to less than forty-five percent).
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Unfortunately, the answer is still unclear. However, there are reasons
to be optimistic. By altering the duties under the education article, the
people of Louisiana may have sent the judiciary a message of permis-
sion. The clear allocation of textual authority would support a reason-
able interpretation that the drafters/people wanted the process, as
opposed to the substance, of the legislative act to be reviewable. If so,
then political crises resulting from unilateral legislative action to de-
fund education may be subject to judicial resolution without presenting
any separation of powers problems. If the legislature has ignored its duty
to negotiate, then the court ought to possess the textual authority to order
the legislature to engage in the negotiation process. This should also be
true for the executive branch through the BESE.
Importantly, this authority would not allow the judiciary to "correct"
educational disinvestments that occur due to successful negotiations
between the branches. In such cases, it seems clear that the authority of
the two co-equal branches to make state policy on education funding and
general state appropriations are out of the reach of judicial control,
unless the court is prepared to explicitly overrule Edwards. Indeed, the
1987 changes might also be reasonably read to indicate a purposeful
intention not to confer authority on the judiciary. In the traditional
"political question" sense of "textual commitment" of a power or duty
to a coordinate branch of government,2 92 the 1987 amendments may be
read to textually commit the negotiation process to the legislative and
executive branches, leaving no role for the judiciary. Considering the
process-based mandates and how these mandates directly track the
court's concerns in Edwards, though, this reading would seem to be a
less plausible reading of the text.
Alternatively, the courts of Louisiana may have the power to reach the
negotiation process, but lack access to the evidence necessary to perform
such review. This is because Louisiana may continue to follow the "jour-
292. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) ("Prominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy deter-
mination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of gov-
ernment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.").
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nal entry rule,"293 a now-disfavored alternative to the stricter "enrolled
bill rule" discussed above.294 It is purest form, the journal entry rule
holds that the entry on the journal of the legislature that the procedural
requirements for passage of a law have been met is the only evidence
(other than the bill itself) that a court will consider of the law's validity,
in a procedural sense.295 The Louisiana courts have recognized and
applied the journal entry rule in the past, but they have not taken a strict
approach. In fact, in applying the rule, the state's courts have drawn a
distinction between procedural restrictions placed on the passage of law
by the rules of the legislature itself (to which the journal entry rule
apparently continues to apply) and procedural requirements imposed by
the state constitution (to which the journal entry rule is inapplicable).296
Thus, it appears that the most likely approach that the Louisiana courts
would take is to enforce the procedural restrictions and requirements
added to Section 13(B) in 1987. Where the legislature cynically ignores
the BESE's prerogatives and legislates outside the negotiation process,
this approach could serve as a useful corrective. However, it cannot be
repeated too often that Section 13(B) will not allow the court to reverse
a collaboratively developed budget reduction, and this sort of budget
reduction may be the most likely reaction to the funding cliff.
Nevertheless, the process-based specification in the Louisiana education
article at least ensures that this inter-branch collaboration will occur.
V. CONCLUSION
Legislative and executive policy making is messy. State constitution-
al framers and reformers should find ways to make it less so, and to
293. See Elizabeth Hunter Cobb, Comment, Judicial Review of the Legislative Enactment
Process: Louisiana's "Journal Entry" Rule, 41 LA. L. REv. 1187 (1981) (outlining the journal
entry rule and its limitations in Louisiana).
294. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
295. See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure:
Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 797, 821-22 (1987)
(explaining the journal entry rule).
296. See H. Alston Johnson, Legislation-Procedure and Interpretation, 45 LA. L. REv. 341,
343 (1984) (reviewing a case in which the Louisiana Supreme Court avoided the journal entry
rule in reviewing the constitutionality of enacted legislation, on the theory that "The courts must
retain the power to ascertain whether a constitutionally prescribed procedure has been followed.
Otherwise, the legislature would be free to assert that it had complied with the constitution, and
there would be no way to determine whether it had or not.") (citing State v. Stirgus, 437 So. 2d
249 (La. 1983); Cobb, supra note 293, at 1199 (arguing for this interpretation).
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make it more predictable and fair. Assigning specific policy making
roles constitutionally serves that purpose, particularly since the separa-
tion of powers is so important in state courts and is so textually promi-
nent in most state constitutions. Specifying substantive outcomes per-
verts the process and hamstrings the legislature and executive, as is evi-
dent in Florida and California. Striving for provisions similar to the
Louisiana education article, and avoiding provisions similar to the
Florida class size provision, should be the focus of future constitutional
reformers.
Exigencies may make it more likely that courts will enforce legisla-
tive substantive duties, including duties to fund education. The experi-
ence in Nevada illustrates this tendency. There, the legislature was not
even sued explicitly based on the education funding duty, but the court
nevertheless ordered its performance, putting to the side a more recent-
ly enacted procedural restriction. However, enforcement of substantive
requirements without regard to procedural protections can lead to polit-
ical backlash, as is also evident from the Nevada experience. Here, I
have argued that a potentially useful drafting strategy involves process-
based specification of the education duties distributed between the polit-
ical branches of government. Such specification allows courts to enforce
duties by enforcing the procedural requirements to fulfill such duties,
rather than by providing content for the duties.
Substance-based specification-as we have seen it in California,
Oregon, and Florida-for some reason does not provide the clear path to
the courthouse that it should. Possibly this is because the idea of judicial
restraint is so ingrained in the role conceptions of state judges that even
a clear substantive requirement will be side-stepped if it requires the
court to mandamus a vote from the legislature. Knowing this tendency,
a better approach is to spell out the desired good-faith negotiation
process and have the courts enforce that process, as the courts likely
would in New Orleans under the Louisiana Constitution. Although no
strategy of constitutional design is a panacea for the problems related to
the allocation of resources in a representative government, the Louisiana
strategy of process specification merits the attention of state constitu-
tional drafters.
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